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ABSTRACT 
Plato has been called the "father of rational 
theology." This thesis is an attempt to examine in the 
light of contemporary Platonic scholarship five of Plato's 
essentially religious doctrines insofar as they support the 
idea that Plato's theory of good and evil is rational. 
Chapters 1 and 2 examine the plausibility of Plato's theory 
of knowledge. Chapter 3 states briefly his theory of Forms, 
while Chapter 4 attempts to give this doctrine credence by 
analysing those aspects of it which seem least convincing. 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider Plato's theory of soul and 
conclude that, although some of his beliefs in this area 
lack credibility, his interpretation of the nature and 
function of soul is basically plausible. Chapters 7 and 8 
examine the rationality of Plato's Idea of the Good. 
Chapter 9 sketches his notion of balance and proportion and, 
in conclusion, Chapter 10 attempts to show how this theory 
provides an underlying credibility not only to all the 
theories discussed but also to Plato's theory of good and 
evil in its entirety. 
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Plato was one of the greatest philosophers, and that largely 
because he combined, simultaneously and uniquely, 
dialectical skill with a metaphysical, indeed religious 
belief in a supra-sensible realm of divine essences, and 
came nearer than anyone else to relating it rationally to 
the world of human experience. (W.K.C. Guthrie). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is an examination of Plato's theory of 
good and evil. Because this theory is "all of Plato" it is 
rather broad to be handled adequately within the scope of a 
study of this length. I have, therefore, put several 
arbitrary limitations on its content. First, although I 
explain the Platonic theories as I present them, my 
treatment of each is very brief. Secondly, because I am 
viewing the dialogues as a whole, my exegesis of particular 
dialogues is very selective. For this reason, also, I do 
not differentiate between the point of view of Socrates and 
that of Plato, nor do I make a distinction between Plato's 
early and late periods, unless, of course, this is necessary 
for the understanding of the topic. Thirdly, although my 
use of secondary sources is somewhat limited, I do try to 
include wherever relevant the comments of Aristotle, Plato's 
greatest pupil. 
As this paper progresses, some questions emerge. The 
first is, What do I mean by "rational"? Rational according 
to what criteria? Rational according to scientific fact? 
Rational according to logic and reason? Rational because it 
appears to be so or seems to make sense? These problems 
result from the fact that Plato's theory is ontological as 
well as logical, metaphysical as well as scientific and, as 
such, must often be talked about in terms of religious 
vi 
metaphor and analogy. Sometimes terms with theistic 
implications must be used, because they seem the best, if 
not the only, ones available. In general, however, my 
definition of the word "rational" is that of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (Vol VIII, 169): "sensible," "sane," 
"reasonable," "not foolish," or "absurd." For example, when 
I say a particular point is rational, I mean according to 
one's experience it seems to "make sense." The idea that 
killing a spider will cause it to rain is "foolish" and 
"absurd." It does not correspond to any experience we have 
in life and is, therefore, not "reasonable." However, the 
idea that good actions and fair play, honesty and 
consideration generally are conducive to harmony both within 
one's self and one's society, while their opposites are not, 
does seem to correspond with life's experience and is, 
therefore, "sensible" and "sane." 
This brings up other questions. What exactly do I 
mean by "good" and "evil"? Am I assuming an absolute 
standard of good or a relative standard of goodness? 
Although Plato employs the terms "good" and "evil" in a 
variety of ways in the dialogues, in general he means by the 
term "good" that which one objectively considers beneficial, 
and "evil" that which one considers not beneficial. The 
ideas of "good" and "evil" which he deems to be most 
important and which, consequently, we must most frequently 
consider, are the negative and positive exemplifications of 
moral absolutes. 
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Within these limitations, this thesis attempts to 
examine in the light of contemporary Platonic scholarship 
five of Plato's essentially religious doctrines insofar as 
they support the idea that Plato's theory of good and evil 
is rational. Chapters 1 and 2 examine the plausibility of 
Plato's theory of knowledge. Chapter 3 states briefly his 
theory of Forms, while Chapter 4 attempts to give this 
doctrine credence by analysing those aspects of it which 
seem least convincing. Chapters 5 and 6 consider Plato's 
theory of soul and conclude that, although some of his 
beliefs in this area lack credibility, his interpretation of 
the nature and function of soul is basically plausible. 
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the rationality of Plato's Idea of 
the Good. Chapter 9 sketches his notion of balance and 
proportion and, in conclusion, Chapter 10 attempts to show 
how this theory gives an underlying credibility not only to 
all the theories discussed but also to Plato's theory of 
good and evil in its entirety. 
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1. 
PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Before we can determine the degree to which Plato was 
able to provide a rational analysis of the meaning of good 
and evil, we must understand his theory of knowledge, part 
of which he borrowed from Socrates. Socrates believed that 
all virtues exist as fixed standards, or paradigms, 
independently of any transitory examples of virtuous conduct 
(1). According to Socrates, to have knowledge of virtue one 
must have knowledge of these paradigms. Any particular 
example of virtue, whether it be piety, courage, temperance 
or friendship, is simply an imperfect example, or copy of, 
the paradigm. If one does not have knowledge of the 
paradigm, one will not know the virtue. Granted, one might 
think that this act of courage or that act of piety is 
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opinions are "...in a state of transition and there is 
nothing abiding (Cratylus 440 a)." 
Building upon Socratic teaching, and upon elements of 
Heraclitean (2) and Pythagorean (3) philosophy, and upon the 
teachings of Parmenides (4), Plato developed the theory that 
knowledge, not only of virtues but of all reality, could be 
found only in reference to transcendent absolutes existing 
apart from the material world as a realm of fixed principles 
(5). Germane to this theory was Plato's belief that the 
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senses failed to give one true knowledge of reality. Sight, 
hearing and touch, he stated, gives to the mind nothing 
more than inaccurate and unreliable impressions of the 
material world (6). In the Theaetetus (185e-186e), Plato 
maintains that one must understand the objects of the 
material world, not through the sensual impressions, but 
through reflection upon sensual impressions (7). 
Perhaps we can understand Plato's idea of reflection 
upon the impressions if we compare the mind to a computer 
assimilating information. The sense organs, we might say, 
work as individual perceptors receiving data--an individual 
eye sees, and individual ear hears, and so on. Each organ 
conveys its own impression of the object--the eye colour, 
the ear sound. Yet we don't think of the object as several 
at once, for the mind sorts the impressions into concepts. 
The resulting concepts are created, not through the organs 
by themselves, but through the mind. In other words, it is 
not by receiving passively what the senses convey, but by 
reasoning about them (reflecting upon them) that the mind 
grasps reality. A good example of this notion is found in 
the Theaetetus (186b): 
SOCRATES: Wait a moment. The 
hardness of something hard and the 
softness of something soft will be 
perceived by the mind through touch, 
will they not? 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
Davis: Plato 3 
SOCRATES: But their existence 
and the fact that they both exist, and 
their contrariety to one another and 
again the existence of this 
contrariety are things which the mind 
itself undertakes to judge for us, 
when it reflects upon them and 
compares one with another. 
THEAETETUS: Certainly. 
Here Plato states that a hard and a soft apple exhibit a 
contrariety which the mind perceives by comparing them. Yet 
the hard one may become soft and that instance of contariety 
vanish. But through reflection, or reason, the mind will 
realize that contrariety remains as an unchanging reality, 
a reality reached only by the mind after some reflection on 
the impressions of the hard and the soft apples. Therefore, 
claims Plato, not only does knowledge of such objects as 
apples come from this sort of reflection upon the 
impressions, but also knowledge of concepts like 
contrariety. In fact, states Plato in the Phaedo (78e), all 
of knowledge, whether of quantities, measurements, shapes, 
colours, moral or aesthetic concepts, comes to us through 
reflection: 
Well, what about the concrete 
instances of beauty-- such as men, 
horses, clothes, and so on--or of 
equality, or any other members of a 
class corresponding to an absolute 
entity? Are they constant, or are 
they, on the contrary, scarcely ever 
in the same relation in any sense 
either to themselves or to one 
another? 
With them, Socrates, it is just 
the opposite; they are never free 
from variation. 
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And these concrete objects you 
can touch and see and perceive by your 
other senses, but those constant 
entities you cannot possibly apprehend 
except by thinking; they are invisible 
to our sight. 
Plato's meaning can be made clearer if we refer to a 
common geometric example. When one's eye sees a circle, 
one's mind receives an impression of the circle. But this 
impression by itself does not give one knowledge of 
circularity. Only through the mind's reflection on the 
impressions of the circle does one come to know the true 
nature of circularity. Knowledge of the true nature of 
circularity includes knowledge of all circles, and not 
simply knowledge of the particular circle which the eye 
sees. This act of reflection is a process of determining 
the true nature or essence of the circle in itself. For 
example, this circle O is perhaps more perfect than some 
circles and less perfect than others. But knowledge of the 
perfection or imperfection of the particular circle is not 
important. What is important is that this circle, 
which is very imperfect and untrue, suggests another circle, 
a perfect circle. One recognizes this particular circle not 
as the perfect circle or the only circle in existence but as 
a copy of the true or perfect circle which it represents. 
In other words, the diagram of the circle elicits a 
particular concept or idea or principle — that of perfect 
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circularity. But no particular circle is the one true 
circle. All particular circles are simply copies of a 
constant standard of absolute circularity. 
This analogy to the circle serves as a stepping stone 
to Plato's more abstract analogy of equality given in the 
Phaedo (74b): 
Well, now, have you ever thought 
that things which were absolutely 
equal were unequal, or that equality 
was inequality? 
No, never, Socrates. 
Then these equal things are not 
the same as absolute equality. 
Not in the least, as I see it, 
Socrates. 
And yet it is these equal things 
that have suggested and conveyed to 
you your knowledge of absolute 
equality, although they are distinct 
from it? 
With this analogy Plato introduces at Phaedo (74d) the idea 
that we have a priori knowledge of these absolutes: * 
Suppose that when you see 
something you say to yourself, This 
thing which I can see has a tendency 
to be like something else, but it 
falls short and cannot be really like 
it, only a poor imitation. Don't you 
agree with me that anyone who receives 
that impression must in fact have 
previous knowledge of that thing which 
he says that the other resembles but 
inadequately? 
This passage presents us with Plato's belief that a priori 
knowledge of transcendent absolutes is contained within our 
immortal souls (8). In the Phaedo (75c) Plato states: 
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Then if we obtained it before our 
birth , and possessed it when we were 
born, we had knowledge, both before 
and at the moment of birth, not only 
of equality and relative magnitudes, 
but of all absolute standards. Our 
present argument applies no more to 
equality than it does to absolute 
beauty, goodness, uprightness, 
holiness, and, as I maintain, all 
those characteristics which we 
designate in our discussions by the 
term 'absolute.' So we must have 
obtained knowledge of all these 
characteristics before our birth. 
That is so. 
And unless we invariably forget 
it after obtaining it we must always 
be born knowing and continue to know 
all through our lives, because 'to 
know' means simply to retain the 
knowledge which one has acquired and 
not to lose it. Is not what we call 
'forgetting' simply the loss of 
knowledge, Simmias? 
In summary, Plato's theory of knowledge maintains, 
that, just as a priori knowledge of equality or of 
circularity can be found only after reflective reference to 
an independent and absolute principle of equality or of 
circularity and not by a purely sensory interpretation of 
the particular circle or the particular instance of equal 
things, and just as a priori knowledge of the qualities like 
beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness can be found only 
after reflective reference to a transcendent and absolute 
principle, so a priori knowledge of all reality can be found 
only by referring to a realm of transcendent absolutes (9). 
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2. 
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Plato's theory of knowledge is based on thfee 
complementary hypotheses. The first is that the senses do 
not give us a true representation of reality. The second is 
that the immortal soul contains a priori knowledge and the 
third that this a priori knowledge is knowledge of a system 
of absolutes. That Plato's first hypothesis is credible can 
be suggested if we refer to an everyday example. The clear 
blue sky which we see does not exist apart from the eye 
which visualizes it. If we fly straight up for the rest of 
our life, we won't reach that flat blue ceiling called sky, 
for the blueness, the flatness, is, in fact, only light 
(especially the short blue wave lengths) refracted and 
dispersed as it passes through the earth's atmosphere. This 
particular image results from the fact that the eye is 
sensitive only to a narrow band of radiation that falls 
between the red and the violet. Thus , a band of a few 
hundred thousandths of a centimeter in wavelength makes the 
difference between what is visible and what is invisible. 
The sky would appear entirely different if we could see 
light rays beyond these two parameters (10). 
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Plato's belief that the senses are not able to give 
us a correct representation of reality becomes more profound 
if we consider for a moment the teaching of Einstein who 
stated that, since every object is "...simply the sum of its 
qualities...", and since qualities are perceived only via 
the senses, "...the whole objective universe of matter and 
energy, atoms and stars...." does not exist except as a 
construction of the senses (11). Because of this, says 
Einstein, knowledge of the universe "...is simply a residue 
of impressions clouded by our imperfect senses (12)." 
Einstein claims that "...the barrier between man , peering 
dimly through the clouded window of his senses, and whatever 
objective reality may exist...." is nearly impossible to 
penetrate (13). Echoing the words of Einstein, Carl Jung 
states that the world exists as such only as it is 
experienced in consciousness (14). Matter itself is an 
hypothesis, claims Jung (15). When you say "matter" you are 
really "...creating a symbol for something unknown (16)." 
Jung declares that "...everything thought, felt or perceived 
is a psychic image, and the world itself exists only so far 
as we are able to produce an image of it (17)." 
The fact that Einstein and Jung agree with Plato's 
first hypothesis suggests to us that it ought to be 
considered a credible notion (18). However, Plato's 
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second hypothesis--that a priori knowledge is contained in 
the immortal soul-- does not seem, at first glance, to be 
credible at all. We might argue that when Socrates in the 
Meno shows that the slave boy knows, without having been 
taught, that the square on the diagonal of the square is 
double the original square's area, he does so by using very 
leading questions. The boy looks at the diagram scratched 
in the sand and says "yes" or "no" to questions which 
suggest the answer. His evidence is based on eyesight and 
not on a priori knowledge. The slave boy gives the correct 
answers, not because he realizes that they must be so, but 
because they look as if they ought to be so. This 
demonstrates the process of reasoning from particular fact 
to general conclusions, but it does not demonstrate a theory 
of a priori knowledge existing in an immortal soul. Julius 
Moravaski in his article "Learning and Recollection" 
correctly states: 
All that Plato can conclude from 
his experiment is that something 
in addition to a deductive 
reasoning capacity must be given 
to the mind innately in order to 
bridge the gap between input and 
understanding (19) 
Plato has no right, says Moravaski, "...to assume that he 
has proven that knowledge is given innately (20)." 
But Plato's theory of recollection cannot be so 
easily dismissed. Flew states that "...what has to be 
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recognized is that whoever taught Meno's slave, no one ever 
taught Pythagoras (21)." As Moravaski himself admits, it 
seems probable "...that something in addition to a deductive 
reasoning capacity must be given to the mind innately... ." 
Findlay rightly points out that the process of learning 
often goes far beyond the methods used in communicating 
knowledge. (22) We can agree that this statement is 
especially relevant when we consider that language, the 
vehicle of learning, does not necessarily give us knowledge 
(23). 
Plato's belief in innate knowledge of the absolutes 
becomes more understandable if we compare his theory with 
Carl Jung's theory that Plato's "forms" are inherited 
psychic archetypes: 
Among these inherited psychic 
factors there is a special class 
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family or to race. These are the 
universal dispositions of the 
mind, and they are to be 
understood as analogous to 
Plato's forms (eidola), in 
accordance with which the mind 
organizes its contents. One 
could also describe these forms 
as categories analogous to the 
logical categories which are 
always and everywhere present as 
the basic postulates of reason 
(24). 
In view of this statement, we might be able to say that 
perhaps Plato's theory of recollection as outlined in the 
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Meno would be more understandable if he had stated that 
knowledge was recollected in the way that innate conceptual 
abilities are inherited. For example, we could argue that 
knowledge of equality comes to us as part of our genetic 
information just as does knowledge of the colour pyramid. 
Any child, providing he is not colour-blind, can distinguish 
without being taught the difference between red and green. 
If the child knows this difference innately, perhaps in the 
same manner he might have innate knowledge of such concepts 
as near and far, high and low, big and small, one and many. 
Cornford, in support of this idea, suggests that we make 
judgements like equality and inequality as soon as we begin 
to use our senses, in infancy (25). Aristotle declares 
that the soul at conception or at birth has within it a set 
of ideals which it strives to achieve. Just as the acorn 
contains within itself the characteristics of an oak tree, 
an individual soul already contains within itself the moral 
and aesthetic absolutes. A man's soul, therefore, is a 
source of knowledge in the sense that it contains pre-natal 
knowledge of specific human ideals (26). 
For Plato, as for Socrates, knowledge meant knowing a 
moral ideal or knowing the essence or true nature of 
something. Plato's theory of knowledge was not concerned 
with knowing a fact or knowing how to do something (27). 
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Therefore, we can realize that Plato's theory does not 
state that knowledge of particulars must be recalled. He 
does not mean that one can recall a particular recipe for 
baking a certain type of cake, or recall the chemical 
formula for a particular drug. For example, particular 
examples of what constitutes equality, the child must learn 
from his culture. In a primitive culture like that of the 
Australian aborigine, two pinches of salt would be equal. 
For the Canadian chemist, however, measuring grams of 
Demorol into a tiny capsule, two pinches would not be equal. 
For both the Australian and the Canadian, absolute equality 
would be the same. What constitutes a particular example of 
equality is learned but, in Plato's terms, the absolute is 
not. Similarly, we could argue that anthropologists say 
that all cultures have the idea of beauty, although what 
constitutes particular examples of beauty differs from 
culture to culture (28). In some cultures women with 
bones through their noses are considered beautiful. In our 
culture they would be considered not beautiful. This 
suggests that what constitutes particular examples of beauty 
is learned. It does not mean, however, that the absolute is 
learned. The particulars are variable but the absolute is 
not. 
If we could say that knowledge of absolutes for 
» Davis: Plato 13 
colour need not be learned, and if we could say that 
knowledge of absolutes of near and far, high and low, big 
and small, one and many, need not be learned; if we could 
say that knowledge of absolutes of equality and beauty need 
not be learned, we might also say that knowledge of all 
absolutes need not be learned and that perhaps they are 
inherited. Unfortunately all that these arguments in favour 
of existence of a priori knowledge prove is that given 
normal intelligence and proper stimulation a person can 
conceptualize without being taught certain abstract ideas. 
Guthrie rightly points out that to acquire these abstract 
ideas is to exercise a "universal human faculty." Without 
it men could not use "...terms like horse and triangle and 
piety." The ability to form concepts is what distinguishes 
man from animals. But this ability is not more than the 
"power of generalization," and the ability to generalize 
about a number of instances, states Guthrie, is not the same 
as Plato's doctrine of a priori knowledge (29). 
Furthermore, even if we could prove that knowledge of 
absolutes is inherited, this would not mean that Plato's 
doctrine is plausible since it is based, not upon a theory 
of genetic inheritance, but upon a belief in the immortality 
of the soul. Therefore, we must conclude that Plato's 
theory of a priori knowledge presents us with a serious 
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problem. 
For the time being, however, we must set this problem 
aside. We cannot consider it further until we have 
considered Plato's theory of soul, and this theory cannot 
be examined until we have discussed Plato's third 
hypothesis, his theory of absolutes, the topic to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS 
To give a precise definition of Plato's absolutes is 
difficult. In Socrates' conversation with Parmenides in the 
Parmenides (132b), he suggests that they might be like 
"thoughts." Later in the same conversation, Socrates 
maintains that they are like "patterns" (132d). Further on 
(135b), Parmenides states that they must be like "essences." 
In book VI of the Republic (507), Plato claims that the 
absolute is like "being" or "essence," like an "aspect," 
"unity," "idea," or "that which really is." In the Phaedrus 
(247c), he likens absolutes to "true being ." In the 
Euthyphro (6d-7), he describes them as "essential forms," 
"standards" or "ideals." In the Greater Hippias (300b), he 
suggests that the absolute is like a "common quality." In 
the Gorgias (497e) , he claims they are "present in" 
particulars. In the Cratylus (440c), he states they are 
"the eternal nature of things." 
Plato's commentators employ a variety of names when 
referring to his "absolutes." Lodge uses the term "idea." 
Lodge maintains that "Idea" could mean for Plato a "group of 
sensuous experiences" or "an ideal concept"; "an 
intelligible unit" or a "conceptual essence of meaning 
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(30)." Like Lodge, Hoernle uses the term "Idea." Hoernle 
claims that for Plato the "Ideas" are "principles" or 
"standards of perfection (31)." Woltersorff uses the term 
"Universal." He says that for Plato the "Universals" are 
"perfect examples of themselves (32)" R.G. Cross and A.D. 
Woozley in their article, "Knowledge, Belief and the Forms," 
state that Plato uses the Greek word "eidos and idea" 
interchangeably. The English word "idea," say Cross and 
Woozley, is an exact translation of the Greek "idea." It 
tends to carry with it the notion that ideas exist only in 
the mind, that they are only thoughts and are only 
subjective. But, state Cross and Woozley, Plato did not 
mean this. Therefore, the English word "form" is preferable 
(33). We cannot say, however, that any one term is the 
right one, for no exact and precise definition can be given 
for a concept which Plato himself called by various names. 
But since most commentators use the term "Form," it is the 
one which will be used in this study. 
As I have pointed out in Chapter One, these Forms 
variously described as "patterns," "essences," "aspects," 
"unities," "paradigms," "ideals" are apprehended not by the 
senses but by thought (reflection on the impressions). 
Because one apprehends the Forms through thought, knowledge 
is found not only in the relationship of the actual 
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particular to the Form, but also in the relationship of 
thought to the Form. The relationship of the particular 
circle to the Form circle is of secondary importance. Of 
primary importance is the mind's ability to apprehend the 
Form of Circle through thought. As a result of this 
relationship between the particulars, the Forms and thought, 
Plato divides reality into two classes, the "visible" or 
"variable" class (the particulars), and the "intelligible" 
class (the Forms). In the Republic (509d-511a) Plato 
represents these two regions by a line divided into four 
equal sections. The Forms occupy the first section of the 
"intelligible" class , numbers the next (34). In the 
"visible" class, the third section consists of plants, 
animals and objects, and the fourth contains their images, 
shadows and reflections. Corresponding to these four 
sections are four methods of cognition (51ia-e). Thought 
(reason) is the highest, understanding is the second, belief 
is the third and picture thinking or conjecture is the 
fourth. The first two he calls intellection, the last two 
he calls opinion. Opinion cognizes the material world, 
intellection cognizes the Forms. All this is nicely summed 
up in the Republic (533e-534b) : 
Are you satisfied then, said I, 
as before, to call the first 
division science, and the second 
understanding, the third belief, 
and the fourth conjecture or 
Davis: Plato 18 
picture thought — and the last two 
collectively opinion, and the 
first two intellection, opinion 
dealing with generation and 
intellection with essence, and 
this relation expressed in the 
proportion: as essence is to 
generation, so is intellection to 
opinion, and as intellection is 
to opinion, so is science to 
belief, and understanding to 
image thinking or surmise? 
To state the same idea more simply, we can say that if 
thought occupies itself with the "visible" world, it will 
achieve opinion only. But if it directs its attention to 
the Forms, it will achieve knowledge. For example, to think 
that one girl is more beautiful than another is to have an 
opinion (35) of beauty, or to think that one act is more 
courageous than another is to have an opinion of courage, 
but it is not at all the same thing as having knowledge of 
the Form of Beauty or the Form of Courage. 
Plato claims that opinion is not necessarily 
undesirable even though it is not knowledge. In the 
Symposium (202a), Diotima declares that a "correct opinion" 
is better than ignorance. In the Meno (98b-c), Socrates 
remarks that "right opinion" can lead one in the proper 
direction, namely, in the direction ofthe Forms. Right 
opinion is not, however, as good as knowledge. In the "way 
to Larissa" analogy in the Meno (7a-b), for example, Plato 
points out that when one has knowledge, one knows not only 
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that something is true but why it is true. The man who has 
been told the right way to Larissa might meet someone who 
tells him differently and go astray. The man who knows the 
road, because he has been there (has a priori knowledge), 
will not be led astray. The essential difference between 
knowledge and true opinion, says Plato, is that, while 
knowledge always represents "stable and unchanging reality," 
true opinion does not, for opinions, founded on the material 
world, the Heraclitean world of flux, are not permanent 
(36). 
We can now consider the importance of the above 
information for this study. According to Plato, we can only 
know what goodness is insofar as we have knowledge of the 
Forms. For example, through reference to the Form of 
Courage we will know whether or not a particular act is 
courageous. If we do not have direct knowledge of the Form 
of Courage, we might nevertheless have a correct opinion of 
what courage is like and, therefore, will initiate a 
courageous act (37). Conversely, if we have neither 
knowledge nor true opinion of the Form we will not know what 
courage is and will not initiate a courageous act. 
Before we can determine if this idea is credible, we 
must determine whether or not this notion of a system of 
Forms is plausible. Commentators from Aristotle to the 
Davis: Plato 20 
present have been examining this problem. It is not 
nearer to resolution now than it was in Aristotle's time. 
In the following chapters some of the aspects of this 
dilemma will be examined insofar as they relate to the 
rationality of Plato's theory of good and evil. 
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4. 
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS 
One of the first arguments we might present against 
the rationality of the theory of Forms is that, despite the 
metaphysical claims made in Chapter One and Two, Forms might 
be nothing more than thoughts in one's mind. Granted we can 
only know this circle is a circle because we have seen other 
circles, and by using reason, can compare it with them and 
find it is like an absolute principle called circularity. 
Similarly, we can conclude that the word "equal" stands for 
a principle called equality just as the word "red" stands 
for a principle called redness. But, as we suggested above 
(page 13), all we have been talking about so far are ideas 
of classes, that is to say, concepts. None of these 
concepts need exist as transcendent Forms apart from the 
thinking mind, and if they do not, the Forms will not be 
absolute principles of goodness, in which case Plato's 
theory of good and evil will immediately lose any credence 
we have thus far given it. Plato himself points out in the 
Parmenides (132b) the possibility that the Forms are only 
thoughts: 
But, Parmenides, said Socrates, 
may it not be that each of these 
forms is a thought, which cannot 
properly exist anywhere but in a 
mind. 
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In answer to Socrates' question, Parmenides states (132b-c) 
that a thought must be of something that is, namely a form: 
Then, is each form one of these 
thoughts and yet a thought of nothing? 
No, that is impossible. 
So it is a thought of something? 
Yes. 
Of something that is, or of 
something that is not? 
Of something that is. 
In fact, of some one thing which 
that thought observes to cover all the 
cases, as being a certain single 
character? 
Yes. 
Then will not this thing that is 
thought of as being one and always the 
same in all cases be a form? 
That again seems to follow. 
Parmenides' answer reminds us of a comment made 
earlier (page 10), namely, that Plato proves in the Sophist 
that language cannot by itself give us knowledge. In this 
dialogue (262c), Plato states that for language to exist, 
verb must be mingled with noun (262c). It is in this 
"weaving together" of verb with noun that the saying or 
thinking what is not happens. When one thinks what is not, 
one joins Forms which should not be joined. To say 
"'Theaetetus, whom I am talking to at this moment, flies'" 
(263a) is to combine verbs and nouns which ought not to be 
combined (263d). Even when words or thoughts are combined 
incorrectly, argues Plato, the separate thought corresponds 
to the separate form and this corresponds to what is. One 
can say what is not, therefore, just as easily as one can 
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think what is not. Based on Plato's argument, we can 
conclude, therefore, that it is incorrect for Parmenides to 
state that Forms must exist since a thought must be of 
something that exists (38). 
The possibility that Forms might simply be thoughts 
appears to do serious damage to the credibility of Plato's 
theory of Forms. Some commentators, on the basis of 
problems brought up in the Parmenides, have suggested that 
Plato himself doubted the existence of transcendent Forms. 
Rist, for example, says that all that Parmenides' argument 
proves is the existence of class concepts. Philosophy, he 
states, operates with general propositions, and if 
particulars cannot be classed, whether or not the classes 
are Forms, then thought is at an end. But class concepts, 
claims Rist, do not prove the existence of transcendent 
Platonic Forms (39). 
Cornford, on the other hand, claims that the 
Parmenides does maintain the full Platonic view of 
transcendent Forms. He reiterates Parmenides argument 
that, because Forms are necessary "... as objects on which 
to fix our thoughts...", and because they are "... constant 
meanings of the words used in all discourse...", they must 
not be "...wholly immersed in the flow of sensible 
things..." and must, therefore, have "...an unchanging and 
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independent existence, however hard it may be to conceive 
their relation to changing individuals (40)." 
Guthrie concurs with Cornford. He states that the 
idea that a Form should be nothing more than a "common 
factor" of the particular is "at variance with" Plato's 
Theory of Forms as set down in the dialogues other than the 
Parmenides (41). "I cannot think," states Guthrie, "that 
Plato would in the Parmenides give up "...the sense given to 
Form in all his previous arguments, which depend for their 
force on the separate and independent existence of Form 
(42)." Like Cornford and Guthrie, Hackforth states that 
Plato believed the Forms to exist apart from and "...indeed 
before the particulars (43)." Similarly, Ross states that 
Plato considered the Forms to be "perfectly objective (44)." 
The consensus among Plato's commentators, then, is 
that Plato does believe in transcendent forms. Personally, 
I agree with Rist's statement that the Parmenides proves 
that Plato believed in the existence of class concepts only, 
and not of transcendent Forms, but I also agree with 
Cornford, Guthrie, Hackforth and Ross who conclude from the 
dialogues as a whole that Plato did believe in transcendent 
Forms. For example, in the Phaedo (74a) Plato states that 
equality is something "beyond" and "distinct" from two equal 
sticks. Also in the Phaedo (79a-80a), when he divides 
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existence into two categories, the "visible" contrasted with 
the "invisible," he is claiming that the Forms exist 
independently of their instantiations: 
Or does each one of these uniform 
and independent entities remain always 
constant and invariable, never 
admitting any alteration in any 
respect or in any sense? 
They must be constant and 
invariable, Socrates, said Cebes. 
Well, what about the concrete 
instances of beauty--such as men, 
horses, clothes, and so on-- or of 
equality, or any other members of a 
class corresponding to an absolute 
entity? Are they constant, or are 
they, on the contrary, scarcely ever 
in the same relation in any sense 
either to themselves or to one 
another? 
With them, Socrates, it is just 
the opposite; they are never free from 
variation. 
In addition, Plato asserts in the Republic with his analogy 
of the Good (507b-509c), of the divided line (509b-511c) and 
of the cave v.514a-519b^  that the Forms are transcendent. 
Similarly , in the Cratylus 454b, Plato argues in favour of 
transcendent Forms when he states that if there were no 
permanent entities, "no eternal nature of things," knowledge 
would be impossible. 
In view of the above textual evidence from the 
dialogues, we must conclude that Plato did believe in 
transcendent Forms. But, we must now ask, Is such a belief 
rational? It was one of Aristotle's objections to Plato's 
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theory of Forms that he (Plato) made them exist apart from 
the particulars (44). Yet, Aristotle admits, the idea of 
Forms is necessary if we are to come to an understanding of 
the particulars. Aristotle claims (Metaphysics 1042a24) 
that sensibles are a combination of Form with matter: 
Now a substance is an underlying 
subject; and in one sense, this is 
matter (by 'matter1 I mean that which 
is not a this in actuality but is 
potentially a this); in another sense, 
it is the formula or the form, which 
is a this and separable in formula; in 
a third sense it is the composition of 
the two, of which alone there is 
generation and destruction, and which 
is separate without qualification, for 
of instances according to formula some 
are separable but others are not. 
In his Metaphysics (999b 34-9) he states that if Form did 
not exist there would be no knowledge of particulars: 
If nothing exists apart from 
individual things, and these are 
infinite, how is it possible to get 
knowledge of an infinite number of 
individuals? For insofar as something 
is one and the same and belongs to 
things universally, to this extent we 
know them all. But if this is 
necessary and something must exist 
besides the individuals, it would also 
be necessary that the genera, whether 
the lowest or the ultimate, exist 
apart from the individuals. But we 
have just discussed the impossibility 
of this.... If nothing exists besides 
the individuals, there would be no 
intelligible object, but all things 
would be sensible and there would be 
no knowledge of anything, unless by 
'knowledge' one means sensation. 
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In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states that only 
universals can be defined and known in the scientific sense. 
He distinguishes in 71b33 the "more knowable in its nature" 
(in Plato's term the "essence of a thing") from "more 
knowable to us: 
Things are prior and better known 
in two ways: for the same thing is not 
prior by nature and prior to us, or 
better known by nature and better 
known to us. The things nearer to 
sense are prior and better known 
relatively to us, those that are more 
remote prior and better known without 
qualification. The most universal 
things are farthest from sense, the 
individual things nearest to it; and 
these are opposed to each other. 
It was Aristotle's conclusion in Metaphysics (1018b32) that 
logically speaking, universals are prior, but in our 
perception the particular comes first. While we perceive 
the individual, perception is of the universal. 
If we summarize Aristotle's logic on this point, we 
can see that according to his line of reasoning Forms must 
exist because: (1) sensibles are a combination of Form and 
matter, (2) there must be a Form if knowledge is to exist, 
(3) that only the Form can be known in a scientific way, (4) 
perception is of the universal. In essence, these 
statements are the same as those outlined in Chapters One 
and Two dealing with Plato's theory of knowledge. There we 
sought to prove the rationality of Plato's theory that true 
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knowledge was knowledge of the Forms. Now, using 
Aristotle's logic, we have attempted to prove the 
rationality of the idea that Forms ought to be considered 
transcendent (even though Aristotle objected to this idea). 
That this idea is plausible can be illustrated by reference 
to the circle. If we see a circle, there are three factors 
involved: a thinking mind, the particular circle and the 
concept of circularity. Now if circular objects and 
circular designs were removed from the world, our minds 
would still have the concept of circle. If we were to die, 
and everyone else on this earth were to die, all the 
individual minds and consequently all the individual 
concepts of circle would die also. But, according to Plato, 
the Form Circle would not. Circle as a Form would exist 
independent of any circle and independent of any individual 
idea or thought of circularity. Or put the same analogy 
into a slightly different context. Although this circle 
C_J will exist for only a short period of time, in fact 
only as long as this paper exists, and although the concept 
of this circle will exist for only as long as our minds 
exist, nevertheless the Form Circle, after which all circles 
are copies, will exist independently of mind and its 
thoughts or concepts. From these examples, we can discern: 
(1) the particular circle, (2) the concept circle, (3) the 
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Form of Circle, and can conclude (according to Plato's 
argument) that while (1) and (2) are impermanent 
(variable), (3) is not only permanent but is, as well, 
transcendent. The above examples can be substituted for any 
of the other Socratic virtues like courage, justice, piety, 
or beauty. If we consider the Form Beauty, for example, we 
realize that that which seems beautiful today perhaps will 
not seem beautiful tomorrow, and that which looks beautiful 
in one light will not look beautiful in another. But the 
(3) Form of Beauty exists unchanged and independent of any 
(2) concepts of beauty and independent of the existence of a 
(1) particular example of beauty (46). 
However, even if we can conclude that Plato's belief 
in transcendent Forms is plausible, we are not yet free from 
problems with his theory of Forms. If the particulars were, 
in fact, not permanent, as Plato maintains, it would be 
impossible both to recognize them and describe them and, 
therefore, impossible to posit from them a Form. Using this 
argument, Gulley claims that Plato's theory of Forms is 
inconsistent with his theory that sensibles are in a state 
of flux: 
This doctrine clearly assumes 
that there are determinate and 
recognisable sensible characteristics; 
indeed it is a doctrine that sensibles 
are determinate and recognisable in so 
far as they 'participate in' and hence 
'resemble' Forms. 
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There is a serious inconsistency, 
then, between this doctrine and the 
consequences drawn by Plato from the 
fact that sensibles are in flux (47). 
But I do not believe that Gulley is correctly interpreting 
Plato's idea of flux. In Plato's view, particulars were 
permanent in the Heraclitean sense. For Heraclitus, a 
building seemed more permanent than a flower but only 
because the permanence of the building was impermanence in 
slow motion. Particulars are sufficiently permanent to 
establish true opinion, claims Plato, but not to establish 
knowledge. 
We have seen from the above discussion that the 
particular and the Form exist in the variable, material 
realm, and in the intelligible, invariable realm, 
respectively. But, we must now ask, if the Form is 
transcendent, existing independently of the particular, 
How exactly is the particular related to the Form? And 
precisely how is the Form related to the particular? When 
asked in the Euthydemus (301a) whether beautiful objects are 
identical with the Beautiful, Socrates replies that they are 
not but that there is present to each of them some beauty. 
"Then," said Dionysodorus, "If you have an Ox with you, you 
are an ox....?" In other words, how can one thing be made 
different simply by the presence of something different? 
Socrates suggests an answer to this question in the Gorgias 
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(497e): 
Do you not call good people by 
that name because of the presence 
in them of things good just as 
you call beautiful things those 
in whom beauty is present? 
This answer is similar to Socrates' comment in the Phaedo 
(lOOd): 
I cling simply and 
straightforwardly and no doubt 
foolishly to the explanation that 
the one thing that makes that 
object beautiful is the presence 
in it or association with it, in 
whatever way the relation comes 
about, of absolute beauty. I do 
not go so far as to insist upon 
the precise details — only upon 
the fact that it is by beauty 
that beautiful things are 
beautiful. 
At first glance I must conclude that Socrates' statements 
that something is beautiful because beauty is present in it 
or it "partakes" or "associates" with beauty is not very 
helpful. I concur with Allen who states that no one who 
has failed to understand "This rose is beautiful," would 
find it illuminating to be told that the expression means 
"This rose partakes of beauty (48)." 
In the Parmenides (132d), however, Socrates does 
offer a credible answer: that the particular is an imperfect 
copy of the Form: 
But, Parmenides, the best I can make 
of the matter is this-- that these 
forms are as it were patterns fixed in 
the nature of things. The other 
things are made in their image and are 
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likenesses, and this participation 
they come to have in the forms is 
nothing but their being made in their 
image. 
Socrates' solution is the most logical way to construe the 
relationship of the Form to the particular. This 
relationship, however, leads in the Parmenides (132e) to the 
famous problem of "the third man" which suggests that the 
Form must be a copy of a second Form and it a copy of a 
third and so on: 
And must not the thing which is 
like share with the thing that is like 
it in one and the same thing 
(character)...? 
Certainly. 
If so, nothing can be like the 
form, nor the form be like anything. 
Otherwise a second form will always 
make its appearance over and above the 
first form, and if that second form is 
like anything, yet a third. And there 
will be no end to this emergence of 
fresh forms, if the form is to be like 
the thing that partakes of it. 
Runciman writes that the "third man" argument reduces 
the Form to the status of a particular. He argues that if 
whiteness is white, which must follow if white objects are 
white by resembling whiteness, then whiteness is one of the 
class of white objects (49). But I do not believe that 
Runciman has taken into account the fact that whiteness is 
not an object. He might search for the rest of his life but 
will not find whiteness. Guthrie, addressing himself to 
Runciman's comments on "the third man," agrees with my 
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conclusion: 
Whiteness is an Intelligible (not 
visible) Form. When it enters a 
material object (say a face) its 
combination with body produces visible 
whiteness, an imperfect imitation of 
the transcendent Form in the only 
medium in which material objects can 
reflect it. The face, which was never 
perfectly white, may turn red by 
•receiving' (Phaedo 102d-e) Redness 
instead of Whiteness, but Whiteness, 
whether 'by itself or in us, will 
always be itself and nothing else 
(50). 
But I do not believe that Guthrie clarifies the problem 
either. To speak of whiteness entering faces and of faces 
receiving redness is like saying that the Form of Circle 
enters the particular circle or the Form of Equality enters 
two unequal sticks. To answer the problem of the "third 
man", I think we must simply return to the discussion 
offered earlier of the Forms in which, by the example of the 
circle, we concluded that, since the Forms are transcendent, 
they can exist independently of the particular which 
imitates them. The particular is an imperfect copy of the 
Form, but the Form is not a copy of anything. It is that 
thing. This conclusion is similar to Findlay's solution to 
the problem of "the third man:" 
...a Form's genuine 
self-predication or being itself, 
while being in a sense the 
paradigmatic source of its connection 
with self in its instances, is none 
the less to be distinguished from the 
latter, and so will not give rise to 
an infinite regress (51). 
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Although we may solve the problem of "the third man" 
by resorting to the fact that the Forms are transcendent, we 
are left with the question, How did Plato think that the 
particulars were related to the Forms? As we have already 
seen, Socrates' answer (see page 28 above) was that the 
particulars are copies of the Forms. But, as we have seen 
above (page 1), Plato did not view the Forms in the same 
light as did Socrates. Guthrie quotes Stallbaum who makes a 
distinction between the logical doctrine of universals held 
by Socrates and the metaphysical doctrine of Forms held by 
Plato. Guthrie states that in the Apology, Crito, 
Euthyphro, Laches, Greater Hippias the Ion, Socrates makes 
no mention of transcendent Forms. All Socrates states in 
these dialogues is that if two things are to be called by 
the same name, they must share some common form or essence 
which is within each one (52). Similarly, Aristotle 
maintains in Metaphysics (1078B30) that Socrates "...did 
not posit the universals as separate." Likewise, Ross, in 
considering this difference in viewpoint between the two, 
concludes: 
In the early dialogues, written 
while Plato was completely dominated 
by the influence of Socrates, it is 
natural that there should be no trace 
of transcendentalism; for Socrates was 
interested, as Aristotle says, only in 
ascertaining the nature which was 
common to all just acts, to all 
beautiful objects, and the like; but 
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as Plato's mind matured he moved 
gradually towards a transcendental 
view of the Ideas as entities existing 
on their own account and only 
imperfectly mirrored in sensible 
things and in human actions (53). 
Therefore, because Socrates did not believe in transcendent 
Forms, his explanation of their relationship with the 
particular will not be the same as that of Plato. 
But precisely how Plato conceived of the Forms 
relating to the particulars is not an easy question for us 
to answer, for he uses such vague and complicated 
terminology to describe them that it is difficult to 
discover exactly what he had in mind. For example, in 
Euthyphro (6d-e) he states that Forms are in things and are 
that by which the particulars are characterized. In the 
Greater Hippias (300a) he claims that Forms are that which 
make the particulars have it. In the Lysis (217d-e) he says 
particulars are characterized by the presence of the Forms. 
In the Gorgias (467e) he suggests particulars share in the 
Forms. In the Greater Hippias (292d) he declares things are 
made beautiful when beauty is added. 
That Plato believed the Forms were in some way 
immanent (54), however, can be concluded from his use of 
expressions like "in things," "characterized," "share in," 
and "being added," but, because Plato did not specify 
precisely how, I conclude, as did Ross (55), that these 
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terms are all used metaphorically. Circles can be 
thought of as "sharing" the Form of Circularity. Beautiful 
things can be thought of as being "characterized" by the 
Form of Beauty. Fighting, by the addition of courage, 
"shares" in the Form of Bravery. The answer to the question 
regarding the rationality of the relation ship of the 
particular to the Form and the Form to the particular, then, 
is that Plato considered the Form to be immanent in the 
particular but, due to his metaphoric use of language, we 
cannot determine exactly how. 
From this lengthy digression upon the transcendence 
of the Forms and their relationship to the particulars, we 
can now return to the statement made at the end of Chapter 
Three, namely, that one can only know what goodness is 
insofar as one has knowledge of the Forms. This discussion 
of the immanence of the Forms allows us to understand with a 
greater degree of clarity the idea that one's own goodness, 
or lack of it, is dependent upon knowledge of, or ignorance 
of, the Forms, for we now see that goodness is dependent 
upon the degree to which the transcendent Form is immanent 
in any particular, be it a quality, an aspiration, a 
decision, an action, and that evil results from lack of Form 
in the particular. From what we have discussed so far, we 
can conclude that Plato's idea that knowledge of good and 
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evil is dependent upon our having knowledge of Forms, 
especially of ethical and aesthetic Forms, seems plausible. 
But two difficult problems remain. Firstly, if there is a 
Form of a mathematical object, like circle, must there not 
be also a Form of Stone and of Hair and even of Mud? 
Among Plato's commentators there is some disagreement 
about Plato's belief in Forms for what might be considered 
"neutral substances." Cherniss, for example, states that 
Plato's writings provide no "definite" and "unambiguous" 
evidence to conclude whether or not he believed in such 
Forms (56). Crombie suggests that Plato regards clay and 
hair as "indeterminate objects," matter "...left to its own 
devices corresponding to no definite ... character" (57). 
Lodge maintains that Plato recognized ideas of all things 
(58). Ross agrees with Lodge but qualifies his "all 
inclusiveness" by stating that when Plato wishes to cite 
typical ideas, he refers either to moral or aesthetic values 
or to mathematical entities. Ideas of substances, Ross 
concludes, are nowhere prominent except in the Timaeus, 
though they are involved with the theory since it was 
Plato's belief that there is an idea corresponding to every 
common name (59). Frazer agrees with Ross. He claims 
that the ideas which Plato primarily idealized and which he 
considered most important were not concrete ideas of things 
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but abstract ones of qualities and especially of moral 
values (60). According to Aristotle in Metaphysics 
1070al8, Plato believed that "...there are Forms as many as 
the things that exist by nature." By positing Forms, 
claimed Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b30), Plato had to say 
there were Forms for everything-- in other words, that he 
was logically committed to the position, not that he held 
it: 
For, in seeking the causes of the 
sensibles, Plato proceeded from 
these to the Forms, which are more 
numerous , so to say, than the 
individual sensibles; for there exists 
a Form bearing the same name as that 
which is predicated of many sensibles, 
of substances as well as of 
non-substances, and of these things as 
well as of eternal things. 
If we consider for a moment specific passages in the 
dialogues we find that Plato definitely did posit Forms for 
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there are Forms for everything: 
Now everything that becomes or is 
created must of necessity be created 
by some cause, for without a cause 
nothing can be created. The work of 
the creator, whenever he looks to the 
unchangeable and fashions the form and 
nature of his work after an 
unchangeable pattern, must necessarily 
be made fair and perfect.... 
Similarly, in the Cratylus (423e) he affirms that there are 
Forms for everything: 
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SOCRATES: Again, is there not an 
essence of each thing, just as there 
is a color, or sound? And is there 
not an essence of color and sound as 
well as of anything else which may be 
said to have an essence? 
Plato's belief in Forms for everything presents us 
with a serious problem. How can a theory be rational which 
posits that goodness depends upon absolutes which are not 
necessarily good? In the Parmenides (130d), Socrates admits 
he has been puzzled by this question. In response, 
Parmenides states (130e) that when Socrates has gained more 
experience in philosophy he will not despise unpleasant 
substances . A similar answer to the same question is given 
by the Stranger in the Sophist (227b). The art of the 
general is not to be considered a more superior form of 
hunting than is the "vermin destroyer." Similarly, in the 
Statesman (266d) the Stranger states that a philosophical 
enquiry is not concerned with degrees of dignity and does 
not despise the smaller more than the greater but makes 
straight for the truth. These three examples suggest to us 
that Plato felt the problem to be simply one of association 
of the Form with unpleasantness or triviality. To 
illustrate Plato's point, we might argue that it is easy to 
associate a particular example of beauty with a metaphysical 
idea of beauty because it is easy to attribute metaphysical 
properties to beauty. It is also easy to assign 
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metaphysical properties to geometric figures, like circles. 
It begins to be difficult for us to ascribe these properties 
to mud and hair. But the problem would not exist if we felt 
differently about hair or about mud. To the Australian 
Aborigine who uses mud to patch the cracks in his house, 
there will be ideal or perfect mud. Probably to the 
hairdresser there is ideal or perfect hair. Commenting on 
this problem, Guthrie asks "...does hair serve no purpose, 
or mud and clay with which bricks are made and in which 
cattle cool themselves (61)?" Plato's own example is the 
ideal shuttle in the Cratylus (389b). The proper definition 
of a shuttle is not a piece of wood such and such a shape 
but is a tool ideally suited for making clothing. The 
carpenter, though not a philosopher with the knowledge of 
the Forms, has an idea of what a perfect shuttle should be 
like because he knows what a shuttle is for. This is the 
same as our saying that the Aborigine would know what 
perfect mud is like because he knows what mud is for (62). 
According to this line of reasoning, common objects, like 
shuttles, have a utilitarian purpose, a goodness of 
function. 
The importance of this idea of goodness of function 
to this treatment of Plato's doctrine of good and evil will 
hopefully be made clear in future chapters. At this point, 
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however, we can conclude that the idea of Forms for trivial 
and unpleasant substances is not irrational, since most 
substances do have a utilitarian purpose. In any case, 
Forms of substances or artifacts are not prominent in the 
dialogues, but because Plato's theory was based on rational 
inquiry, he found it necessary, as Aristotle claimed, to 
posit Forms for everything. Yet Plato's primary interest 
was in moral, aesthetic, and mathematical Forms. 
However, one problem remains. If there can be a Form 
of Mud and of Hair must we not conclude also that there 
ought to be Forms for qualities which might be considered 
evil such as injustice, cowardice or hate? And if we 
can, doubt is cast upon Plato's theory that goodness depends 
upon knowledge of the Forms. Ross states that there is 
evidence that Plato did believe in the existence of Forms of 
evil: 
It might be possible for a theory 
of Ideas to dispense with an Idea of 
evil and with Ideas of its species, 
and to explain all evil in the 
sensible world as due to the fact that 
the relation of the phenomenal to the 
ideal is never one of perfect 
instantiation but always one of 
imitation which falls short of its 
pattern. But there is nothing to show 
that Plato ever took this line (63). 
For proof of this point, Ross cites the Republic (476a and 
403b), the Sophist (257e and 258b), the Euthyphro (5d) and 
the Theaetetus (176e). 
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I agree that in the Republic (402b) Plato does seem 
to state that there are Forms for the opposites of qualities 
like soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness: 
Then, by heaven, am I not right 
in saying that by the same token we 
shall never be true musicians 
either —neither we nor the guardians 
that we have undertaken to 
educate —until we are able to 
recognize the forms of soberness, 
courage, liberality and 
high-mindedness, and all their kindred 
and their opposites, too, in all the 
combinations that contain and convey 
them.... 
I agree that in the Sophist (257e) Plato does seem to say 
that there is a Form for the "not beautiful": 
STRANGER: So it appears that the 
not-beautiful is an instance of 
something that exists being set in 
contrast to something that exists. 
THEAETETUS: Perfectly. 
STRANGER: What then? On this 
showing has the not-beautiful any less 
claim than the beautiful to be a thing 
that exists? 
THEAETETUS: None whatever. 
After this passage he goes on to suggest, seemingly, at 258b 
that any "what-is-not" must have a Form: 
STRANGER: Has it then, as you 
say, an existence inferior to none of 
the rest in reality? May we now be 
bold to say that 'that which is not' 
unquestionbly is a thing that has a 
nature of its own—just as the tall 
was tall and the beautiful was 
beautiful, so too with the not-tall 
and the not-beautiful --and in that 
sense 'that which is not' also, on the 
same principle, both was and is 'what 
is not,' a single form to be reckoned 
among the many realities? Or have we 
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any further doubts with regard to it, 
Theaetetus? 
THEAETETUS: None at all. 
I also agree that in the Euthyphro (5d) Plato seems to imply 
that unholiness has a Form: 
Is not the holy always one and 
the same thing in every action, and, 
again, is not the unholy always 
opposite to the holy, and like itself? 
And as unholiness does it not always 
have its one essential form, which 
will be found in everything that is 
unholy? 
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, surely Socrates. 
I must admit that in the Theaetetus (176e) Plato does seem 
to state that there is a system of Forms for the evil just 
as there is for the Good: 
SOCRATES: There are two 
patterns, my friend, in the 
unchangeable nature of things, one of 
divine happiness, the other of godless 
misery-- a truth to which their folly 
makes them utterly blind, unaware that 
in doing injustice they are growing 
less like one of these patterns and 
more like the other. The penalty they 
pay is the life they lead, answering 
to the pattern they resemble. 
Yet in spite of the above examples, I do not believe 
that Plato posited Forms of evil qualities. I do not agree 
that there is reference to Forms of evil in the Theaetetus 
(176e). Plato is referring here to the ungodliness of the 
material world as opposed to the divinity of the 
intelligible (64). To explain the reference to Forms of 
unholiness in the Euthyphro (5d), I doubt that Plato could 
be referring to Forms here because at this early stage in 
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the dialogues the theory had not yet evolved. I do not 
believe that Plato in the Sophist (257e) is positing forms 
of evil. The "not beautiful" and the "not just" are 
collective terms for all the Forms other than the Form 
Beautiful or Just (65). The Sophist as a whole argues for a 
sort of "not-being" throughout the whole realm of the Forms. 
Every Form is different from countless other Forms. This 
"not-being" is not in any way opposite to being, it is 
merely different from it (66). These statements in the 
Sophist are like the ones in the Phaedo (105d-e) in which 
the "uneven," the "unjust" and the "uncultured" are terms 
for those conditions that do not admit (the "particular" is 
not "immanent in") the respective Forms . 
Insofar as the Republic (402b) and (476a) is 
concerned, I feel that the problem of Plato's fairly 
definite reference to Forms of evil is not so easily 
resolved. The difficulty here is in knowing whether or not 
Plato is referring to his theory of Forms. Commenting on 
this same problem in the Sophist, Seligman states that 
Plato's term "beautiful" can mean "...both the beautiful 
itself (the form of beauty), etc., and that which is 
beautiful (67)." I should point out that this problem 
occurs in the other dialogues as well, but in these 
instances it is more easily resolved. For example, in the 
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Theaetetus (186a-c) Plato refers to "honourable" and 
"dishonourable" and "good" and "bad" as though there were a 
Form for each. But here he is discussing his theory of 
dialectic, not his theory of Forms: 
SOCRATES: And also likeness and 
unlikeness and sameness and 
difference? 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
SOCRATES: And how about 
'honorable' and 'dishonorable' and 
'good' and 'bad'? 
THEAETETUS: Those again seem to 
me, above all, to be things whose 
being is considered, one in comparison 
with another, by the mind, when it 
reflects within itself upon the past 
and the present with an eye to the 
future. 
Similarly, in Laws X (900d), Plato discusses good and evil 
in terms not of Forms but simply of contrary qualities: 
ATHENIAN: Then let them join us 
in asking what we mean by the goodness 
in virtue of which we confess the gods 
to be good. Come, now, prudence, may 
we say, and understanding belong to 
goodness, their opposites to badness? 
CLINIAS: We may. 
ATHENIAN: And again that valor 
is part of goodness, cowardice of 
badness? 
CLINIAS: Assuredly. 
ATHENIAN: And the latter 
qualities we shall call shameful, the 
former noble? 
CLINIAS: No doubt we must. 
Likewise, a few pages later in the same dialogue (906a-d) 
Plato states that righteousness, temperance and wisdom are 
good while their opposites, wrong, arrogance and folly are 
bad, but again, he is not referring to Forms, only to 
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qualities. Section (402b) of the Republic is like the 
pasages from the Laws X and the Theaetetus in that Plato is 
referring to contraries but not to Forms. However, this is 
not the case with the Republic (476a) in which he definitely 
states that "the unjust" and "the bad" have Forms: 
And in respect of the just and 
the unjust, the good and the bad, and 
all the ideas or forms, the same 
statement holds, that in itself each 
is one, but that by virtue of their 
communion with actions and bodies and 
with one another they present 
themselves everywhere each as a 
multiplicity of aspects. 
Right, he said. 
This statement supports a theory that Plato believed in 
Forms for evil qualities. Consequently, if these texts were 
the only evidence available, we would be left with no 
unequivocal answer as to whether Plato believed in Forms of 
evil. Fortunately, however, there are passages in which 
Plato states definitely that he did not. For example, in 
the passage from the Theaetetus (176a-b) he states most 
emphatically that there is no evil in the world of Forms: 
SOCRATES: Evils, Theodorus, can 
never be done away with, for the good 
must always have its contrary, nor 
have they any place in the divine 
world, but they must needs haunt this 
region of our mortal nature. 
That Plato did not assume Forms of evil we can verify by 
referring to the following passage in the Phaedrus (250a) in 
which Plato states that if souls become involved with 
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unrighteousness they forget what they saw in the world of 
the Forms: 
Now, as we have said, every human 
soul has, by reason of her nature, had 
contemplation of true being; else 
would she never have entered into this 
human creature; but to be put in mind 
thereof by things here is not easy for 
every soul. Some, when they had the 
vision, had it but for a moment; some 
when they had fallen to earth 
consorted unhappily with such as led 
them to deeds of unrighteousness, 
wherefore they forgot the holy objects 
of their vision. 
Had unrighteousness, in other words, evil, been one of the 
Forms, men by participating in it, would recollect, not 
forget these Forms. In his reference to the ugly and the 
unjust in the Republic (479d), Plato states that these 
belong to that region between "being" and "not-being", in 
other words, not to the region of the Forms: 
Do you know what to do with them, 
then? said I. And can you find a 
better place to put them than that 
midway between existence or essence 
and the not to be? For we shall 
surely not discover a darker region 
than not- being that they should still 
more not be, nor a brighter than being 
that they should still more be. 
In Socrates' discussion with Parmenides (130c-d) about the 
various kinds of Forms, he makes no mention of evil forms 
but only of trivia: 
Are you also puzzled, Socrates, 
about cases that might be thought 
absurd, such as hair or mud or dirt or 
any other trivial and undignified 
objects? Are you doubtful whether or 
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not to assert that each of these has a 
separate form distinct from things 
like those we handle? 
We can conclude from the preceding, then, that: (1) 
there are many passages in which Plato definitely states 
there are no Forms for evil, (2) there are many passages in 
which Plato refers to evil in the context of opposites but 
not in the context of his theory of Forms and (3) there is 
one passage in the Republic in which Plato seems to suggest 
Forms of evil. If we consider this problem in the light of 
Plato's theory of Forms as a whole, we must conclude that 
Forms of evils of any sort could not possibly exist since, 
according to the theory, Forms are principles of goodness, 
and evil results from lack of immanence of these Forms. We 
must deduce from this argument, therefore, that Plato did 
not posit Forms of Evil. 
I think that there are two main reasons why there are 
passages in the dialogues which seem to suggest Forms for 
evil. As I stated above (page 31), Socrates posited a Form 
for every group of particulars which have the same name 
because to use names, he thought, was to assume a common 
nature among the things named. But in Socrates' use of the 
term, "form" meant a common essence, whereas Plato used the 
term to mean a transcendent Form. Therefore, the passages 
which seem to suggest forms of evil are only, in fact, 
reflecting the Socratic use of the term "form," meaning 
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"common essence." Secondly, Plato shared in the Greek habit 
of seeing the world in terms of opposites and, consequently, 
often referred to good and evil in this context, without 
being careful to specify when he meant Forms and when he did 
not (68). With the above conclusions Frazer agrees: 
...that in the case of pairs of 
contraries, Plato made an Idea of only 
one of the pair; for where the 
contraries were not (like justice and 
injustice, courage and cowardice ) 
opposed as good and evil, he had no 
hesitation in making ideas of both 
contraries, eg. of greatness and 
smallness, heat and cold. But of 
qualities distinctly bad, Plato never 
really constructed Ideas (69). 
Guthrie maintains that we are left with much uncertainty on 
the subject because the dialogues never squarely face the 
question. But, in spite of this, Guthrie concludes that 
although the Forms are either negatively or positively 
exemplified, Plato does not make Forms of evil: 
...two things can be said at 
once: first, the question was of no 
great interest to Plato; second, at no 
period did he allow a place for evil 
of any kind in the realm of the 
divine, which was the home of the 
eternal, changeless Forms (70). 
That a particular may exemplify the Form either negatively 
or positively means it may be an example of Form, or a lack 
of Form. This line of thought is essentially Aristotle's 
system of form, matter and privation (Physics, 191bl5). The 
first is perfection, the second is that which desires 
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perfection, the third is not a third component but a way of 
referring to the degree to which the Form is not actualized 
(71): 
Now we, too (who recognize both 
'form' and 'lack of form,' or 
shortage, as factors in becoming) 
assert that nothing can 'come to be,' 
in the absolute sense, out of the 
non-existent, but we declare 
nevertheless that all things which 
come to be owe their existence to the 
incidental non- existence of 
something; for they owe it to the 
'shortage' from which they started 
'being no longer there.' 
This statement brings us back to our earlier discussion in 
which we stated that evil results from lack of immanence of 
the Forms (page 33 above). In view of all that we have 
discussed since then, we can now rephrase Plato's theory of 
good and evil. The goodness of the particular is dependent 
upon the degree of immanence of the Forms. Our knowledge of 
good and evil is dependent upon our having knowledge of the 
Forms, particularly those Forms relating to moral and 
aesthetic qualities. Evil is lack of immanence of the Forms 
in the particulars; evil is the result of our ignorance 
of the Forms. 
To summarize thus far, we can state that in the 
preceding chapters we have attempted to determine that 
Plato's belief in a system of transcendent Forms of which 
the particulars are copies seems rational. We have also 
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attempted to give credence to Plato'<s theory that true 
knowledge of any sort and, consequently, knowledge of what 
causes something to be good, or of what constitutes 
goodness, is dependent upon one having knowledge of these 
Forms. In discussing the above two ideas, we have 
considered the rationality of the theory that evil results 
from our lack of knowledge of the Forms, or lack of Form in 
the particular. We are left, however, with one doctrine 
which has proven to be irrational, namely, the theory that 
the soul is immortal. To this we shall now turn. 
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5. 
PLATO'S THEORY OF SOUL 
In the preceding chapters we examined the rationality 
of Plato's theory of knowledge and his theory of Forms as it 
related to his theory of good and evil. Now the credibility 
of these theories can be examined in the context of Plato's 
theory of soul. Before proceeding, however, we must 
determine exactly what Plato means by his term "soul." Lodge 
states that for Plato "...'soul' and 'mind' are intended to 
coincide in all respects (72)." Guthrie states that Plato 
uses the word "soul" to mean "...that which performs all 
vital functions like nourishment, reproduction, sensation 
and thought, through the medium of the body." Guthrie claims 
that, for Plato, the term "soul" "...meant mind or 
intelligence or that which animates the body" (73). 
Hamilton and Cairns state the word "soul" is a translation 
of the Greek word "psyche." It is more properly translated, 
depending on the context of the dialogues, as "...Reason, 
Mind, Intelligence, Life, the vital principle in things as 
well as in man (74)." 
For the purposes of this study we will use the 
definition give n by Hamilton and Cairns since it seems to 
come closest to the rather complex notion of soul suggested 
by Plato in the dialogues. In the Timaeus (51d) and in the 
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Theaetetus (186a), for example, Plato declares that it is 
the mind that apprehends the Forms. In the Philebus (59d), 
he affirms that the Forms are apprehended by reason, 
intelligence and thought. But in the Phaedo (66b-e) he 
concludes that the Forms are apprehended by the soul. 
Therefore, according to Plato, mind, thought, reason and 
intelligence, commonly referred to as nous (75), are in some 
way a function of the soul. In the same passage he also 
states that the soul contains "...loves and desires and 
fears and all sorts of fancies...", qualities commonly 
thought of as emotions, and that these come from the body. 
According to Plato, therefore, the soul contains not only 
mind, intelligence, thought and reason, but also emotion. 
In Laws X (897a), Plato states that souls contain 
such "motions" as "...wish, reflection, foresight, counsel, 
judgement... pleasures, pain, hope, fear, hate, love...." 
We can divide these "motions" into two classes : wish, 
reflection , foresight, counsel and judgement fit into one 
category; pleasure, pain, hope, fear and hate fit into 
another. The former are activities of the mind; the latter 
of the body, being related to emotion and desire. In "Book 
IV" of the Republic (439a-e), Plato outlines this idea of 
duality within the soul in more detail. Here he divides the 
soul into distinct sections: the higher soul and the lower 
Davis: Plato 54 
soul. Reason and rationality, he declares, reside in the 
higher; appetites and desire in the lower. In addition, he 
notes (439e) that the soul contains something called "high 
spirit," a term which means "the passionate" (550b). 
According to Plato, high spirit sometimes aligns itself with 
reason, and sometimes with desire (440a-e). 
In the Phaedrus (253-257), Plato illustrates in his 
story of the charioteer how these parts function together. 
Here the soul, which is analogous to the two horses and the 
driver, consists of three parts (76): the rational, the 
passionate or "spirited", and the "appetitive." The reason 
or rational part is the governor of the soul just as the 
driver is the governor of the chariot. The appetitive part 
of the soul is like the black horse which rebels against 
reason and control. The emotional or passionate part is 
like the white horse which, caught between the black horse 
and the driver, follows first one, then the other. But both 
the emotional and the appetitive are governed by reason 
(nous), just as the two horses are governed by the driver. 
Because the Forms are apprehended through the mind, 
thought, reason and intelligence, Plato cannot mean that the 
soul in its entirety perceives the Forms; rather he must 
mean the Forms are perceived only through the reason, the 
higher part. This statement can be verified if we refer to 
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the dialogues. In the Apology (23a) and in Phaedrus (278d), 
Plato states that nous is the immortal part of the soul, the 
part which links man to the divine. He says the same thing 
in more complicated terms in the Sophist (248a). "We are in 
touch with becoming by means of the body through sense," he 
states, "...whereas we have intercourse with real being by 
means of the Soul through reflection." In the Symposium 
(211c) and in the Republic (532a), Plato describes cognition 
of the Forms as not simply remembering, as in the Meno, but 
realizing through "visionary experience (77)." According 
to Plato's description of the activities and functions of 
the soul, therefore, it is generally dual in nature, nous 
being the controlli ng part, emotion and desire the 
controlled. This is not different from our definition (page 
49) which divides soul into "psyche" and "the vital 
principle of things." This two-fold division corresponds to 
the two classes of reality pointed out in Chapter Four, the 
"visible" and the "intelligible." The body, states Plato 
(the Republic (507d-511c), belongs to the visible and 
variable, while the soul belongs to the intelligible 
(invisible and invariable). The soul, then, belongs to the 
same class as do the Forms and, as stated above, serves as a 
link between the material and the intelligible worlds. 
According to Plato in the Phaedo (67a), attachment by 
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the lower soul to the pleasures of the "variable" causes 
"contamination" of the entire soul: 
It seems that so long as we are 
alive, we shall continue closest to 
knowledge if we avoid as much as we 
can all contact and association with 
the body, except when they are 
absolutely necessary, and instead of 
allowing ourselves to become infected 
with its nature. 
Here he explains that there are "true pleasures" and "false 
pleasures." True pleasures are those which draw one closer 
to the Forms, learning for example, and those which through 
"self-mastery" are controlled by measure, proportion and 
limit (Philebus 63a, 52c). False pleasures, he adds, are 
unlimited, disproportionate, or uncontrolled emotion, 
appetite or desire (Philebus 27e, 31a). The individual 
(soul) chooses to control or not, its own appetite and 
desire. Therefore, claims Plato, the individual (soul) 
through self-mastery (78), or lack of it, chooses to be 
either evil or good. "For as a man's desires tend," says 
Plato, "...so and such does everyone of us come to be (Laws 
X, 904c)." 
From this lengthy digression on Plato's theory of 
soul, we can now understand how it relates to his theory of 
good and evil. Plato maintains that if the higher soul 
(nous) reaches the Forms, the soul in its entirety will 
attain knowledge and consequently, goodness. But, he 
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states, if the soul fixes its attention on the visible and 
variable, if the soul is controlled by the appetites, 
emotions and desires for pleasure, in other words, if the 
soul is controlled by its own lower nature, there is no 
chance of its ever attaining the Forms and, consequently, of 
its ever attaining knowledge. 
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6. 
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF SOUL 
It is not difficult for us to relate this concept 
that good and evil are dependent upon self-mastery to the 
earlier statement that good and evil are dependent upon 
knowledge or ignorance of the Forms. In most instances, 
whether or not we choose a life of appetite and lust can be 
dependent upon ignorance and knowledge, i.e., upon the 
wisdom of one's choice. But, we could argue, often 
appetite, desires and emotions come upon us regardless of 
choice. For example, even though one has knowledge of the 
Forms, one will nevertheless be jealous if one's wife runs 
away with someone else. Plato's answer to this problem is 
given in the Symposium (210e). Having had a "...vision of 
the very soul of beauty...." one will never again be seduced 
by the beauty of any individual. 
The idea of transcending material beauty seems to 
most of us basically irrational. We must remember, however, 
that this kind of "self-transcendence" through mystical 
experience is central to the Eastern religious traditions 
(Advaita Vedanta) and is certainly a part of Christianity 
(St. John of the Cross, Thomas Merton, St. Augustine). 
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Therefore, since every religious tradition has instances of 
this type of self-transcendence, we can agree that the 
statement that emotions and desires of the material world 
can be transcended might be given credence, although the 
"mystical life" is not, for the most of us, very rational. 
However, there are more causes of evil than ignorance 
and lack of self-mastery. For example, even if we are not 
susceptible to our emotions and desires, and even if we 
have knowledge, we still must face personal tragedy like 
sickness or death, or calamities like floods or hurricanes. 
And surely these must be considered evil. Plato does 
realize that evil often seems to result from forces over 
which man has no control. For example, in the Timaeus 
(86d), he states that bodily disorders cause disorders of 
the soul: 
The truth is that sexual 
intemperance is a disease of the soul 
due chiefly to the moisture and 
fluidity which is produced in one of 
the elements by the loose consistency 
of the bones. And in general all that 
which is termed the incontinence of 
pleasure and is deemed a reproach 
under the idea that the wicked 
voluntarily do wrong is not justly a 
matter of reproach. For no man is 
voluntarily bad, but the bad by reason 
of an ill disposition of the body and 
bad education-- things which are 
hateful to every man and happen 
against his will. 
Plato maintains in the Timaeus (87a-b) that malfunctions in 
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the body cause an infinite variety of evil conditions in the 
soul such as "ill temper," "meloncholy," "rashness," 
"cowardice," "forgetfulness," and "stupidity." Besides 
these causes of evil, Plato names in the Republic (617-618) 
one other. Evils like personal disease and calamity, Plato 
says, result from a force called "necessity." 
According to Wheelwright (79), the Greeks of Plato's 
time believed necessity was responsible for whatever lay 
outside the "range of human planning." An event caused by 
necessity was accidental, something that had happened by 
chance (80). Guthrie states that Plato meant by his term 
"necessity" a cause "...'destitute of reason producing 
chance results without order.'" These events are not 
designed but just happen. Matter, explains Guthrie, has its 
own "...necessary characteristics indifferent to reason or 
to values." Fire for example "...may warm a house and cook 
meals, or it may destroy the house and kill its owner (81)." 
In the Laws V (732b-d), Plato declares that these 
two antagonistic principles—reason and necessity--form a 
sort of "divine battleground" with the individual soul 
caught between. Sometimes the soul of the individual is 
under control of the one and sometimes under control of the 
other, and the best he can do is hope that his misfortunes 
will not last: 
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It should be our constant hope 
that God, by the blessings he bestows, 
will lighten the troubles that come 
upon us, and change our present state 
for the better, while, with Heaven's 
favor, the very reverse will always be 
true of our blessings. 
But, maintains Plato, even when the soul is taken 
over by necessity, in which case the evil is not the fault 
of the individual, nevertheless he is responsible for his 
own conduct and is required to become good. In the Timaeus 
(90a-e), Plato states that the "creator" has done his best 
within the limits set by necessity to facilitate the rule of 
the rational part, but whether reason or necessity emerges 
superior in the end is left to the individual. 
Up to this point Plato's theory of soul, insofar as 
it relates to his theory of good and evil, seems basically 
rational. We cannot doubt the rationality of Plato's theory 
of self-mastery. Greed for pleasure is almost always 
destructive, and certainly we all know through experience 
that goodness, or lack of it, depends upon our ability to 
control our own self-centered drives. Similarly, we can 
agree that disease of the body can cause disease of the 
soul. Likewise, we must agree, much of what appears to be 
evil is caused by accident and chance. Physical diseases 
just happen, calamities occur for no reason. But in the 
Timaeus (91d-92c) Plato links his doctrine of self- mastery 
with his theory of immortality. He states that the 
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consequences of not achieving self-mastery are reflected not 
only in this life but also in the future life. He who has 
cherished knowledge will attain after death divine 
happiness. But he who has not, will be reborn as a bird or 
an animal or a fish (82). 
Plato attempts in three instances to prove this 
theory (83). In the Phaedo (78b-84b), he states that since 
one's soul (nous) belongs to the same realm as do the Forms, 
like the Forms it is immortal. By way of proof, he argues 
that a Form will never receive a contrary Form. The Form 
Snow, for example, will never receive the contrary Form Heat 
just as the Form Even will never receive the contrary Form 
Odd. Soul, Plato argues, is what gives life to the body. 
Life always accompanies soul. It is an essential attribute 
of it. Life, he concludes in the Phaedo (106b), cannot 
contain its opposite, death and still remain soul. It is 
essentially deathless as snow is heatless: 
Are we not bound to say the same 
of the immortal? If what is immortal 
is also imperishable, it is impossible 
that at the approach of death soul 
should cease to be. It follows from 
what we have already said that it 
cannot admit death, or be dead--just 
as we said that three cannot be even, 
nor can odd; nor can fire be cold, nor 
can the heat which is in the fire. 
Certainly, neither I nor any of Plato's commentators 
could be convinced by this discussion. Although snow is 
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heatless and fire is coldless, this does not mean that snow 
cannot melt or fire be put out. Besides, for such a theory 
to be tenable at all, Plato would have to believe that soul 
is a Form. Hackforth states that Plato gave soul the status 
of Form for this argument only (84). Guthrie, however, 
states that Plato does not regard soul as a Form (85). 
Personally, I do not see how the tripartite soul of the 
Phaedrus and the Republic, divided as it is between emotion 
and nous, could be considered to be Form, which by 
definition is unified goodness. The whole idea of good and 
evil soul —an evil soul transmigrating from one body to 
another or souls through pursuit of pleasure being brought 
down to earth and reborn as animals—is contrary to Plato's 
definition of Form. Even if we argue that only nous is a 
Form (a perfect particular), this would not resolve the 
problem, for both evil and good souls are considered by 
Plato to be immortal. 
Plato tries a second proof for immortality in the 
Republic (609-610). For everything, there is an evil 
which destroys it, as eyes by ophthalmia, the body by 
disease, crops by blight, timber by rot, metals by rust, and 
so on. If there is anything whose specific evil cannot 
destroy it, it must be indestructible. The soul has its own 
specific evil, wickedness, which though it depraves, cannot 
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destroy. Therefore, claims Plato, though the body is 
destroyed by its natural evil, disease, the soul is 
indestructible. 
I think this argument is equally unconvincing. 
Wickedness does not destroy the soul, but neither does 
disease necessarily destroy the body. According to Plato's 
argument, we could say that life—an essential attribute 
of both body and soul —has its own specific evil: death. 
Consequently, it is death that destroys both body and soul, 
not disease and wickedness. 
In the Phaedo (85eff) Plato's analogy of the soul to 
the melody of the lyre also suggests an argument for 
immortality. Plato explains that a melody exists eternally 
independent of any instrument and is brought into existence 
by anyone who discovers the correct combination of notes. 
This discussion may prove the immortality of a particular 
song but not, unfortunately, the immortality of soul. 
Neither does Plato's discussion in the Meno. Here Plato 
attempts to prove not only that soul contains a priori 
knowledge, but also that it is immortal. In Chapter Two we 
saw that, although the Meno might suggest the existence of a 
priori knowledge, it does not prove the existence of 
immortality. 
However, even though Plato believed in immortality, 
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he himself regards his theory of soul with some misgivings. 
For example, in the Phaedo (85c), he states that "...it is 
very difficult if not impossible to achieve certainty about 
these questions." A few pages later in the Phaedo (107c) he 
states that even if the soul is not immortal, one ought to 
treat it as though it were since it would be "...extremely 
dangerous to neglect it." Plato goes on to say (114d) that 
the facts are not necessarily as he describes them, but they 
must be something like this: 
Of course, no reasonable man 
ought to insist that the facts are 
exactly as I have described them. But 
that either this or something very 
like it is a true account of our souls 
and their future habitations—since we 
have clear evidence that the soul is 
immortal—this I think, is both a 
reasonable contention and a belief 
worth risking, for the risk is a noble 
one. 
In the Phaedrus (246a) he states that what the soul is we 
cannot say but only "...what it resembles." We must 
conclude, therefore, that Plato never intended us to take 
his figurative language dogmatically. When in the Meno 
(86b) Plato states "I would not take the oath on the whole 
story...," he surely means that he chooses not to be 
dogmatic about something which can only be discussed 
metaphorically. Similarly, in the Timaeus (72d) he admits 
that he is only suggesting a "probable" answer: 
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Concerning the soul, as to which 
part is mortal and which divine, and 
how and why they are separated, and in 
what company they are placed, if God 
acknowledges that we have spoken the 
truth, then, and then only, can we be 
confident; still, we may venture to 
assert that what has been said by us 
is probable, and will be rendered more 
probable by investigation. Let us 
assume thus much. 
Although we must admit that Plato's theory of the 
immortality of the soul is not rational, we must deduce that 
Plato's point of view is. To admit that he "does not know" 
is to take a rational stance. But, we might argue, since 
the credibility of the theory of good and evil depends on 
the credibility of the theory of Forms, and this depends, to 
a certain extent, on the credibility of his theory that the 
Forms are recollected by the immortal soul, our attempt to 
give Plato's theories a rational basis has ended in defeat. 
Fortunately, however, we are not so easily beaten, for we 
are able to overcome this problem by turning to Plato's idea 
of dialectic, the theory which we will discuss in the next 
chapter as part of our discussion on Plato's the Good. 
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7. 
PLATO'S IDEA OF THE GOOD 
In "Book VI" of the Republic, Plato states that the 
Good is the cause "...of knowledge, and truth insofar as 
known," that the Good "...gives truth to the objects of 
knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower (508e)," 
that the good is the "...authentic source of truth and 
reason," that the Good is the cause of all"...that is right 
and beautiful (517c)," that it is through reference to the 
idea of the Good that "...just things and all the rest 
become useful and beneficial (505a)." The Good, therefore, 
according to Plato, is the cause of the Forms as well as the 
cause of knowledge and reason. In other words, the Good is 
the cause of the exact qualities which we have up to this 
point found essential to the grasp of what goodness is. 
But what, we must ask, does Plato mean by his term 
"the Good"? Plato himself repeatedly warns that formulating 
a definite description of the Good is beyond his power. 
Consequently, his attempt to define the Good is by the use 
of analogy. The Good, states Plato, is to reason and the 
"objects of reason," as the sun is to vision, and the 
"objects of vision" (508b). The objects of reason, namely 
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the Forms, derive their "existence and essence" from the 
Good just as the objects in the visible world derive their 
"generation and growth" from the sun. And just as the sun 
provides light which enables the eye to see the objects of 
vision, the Good provides "reason and knowledge" which 
enables the soul to see the Forms. But just as the sun 
itself is not "generation and growth," nor is it the object 
of vision, the Good is not the Forms, nor is it "reason" and 
"knowledge" (509a). In other words, if we might introduce 
an analogy for what is already an analogy, just as a 
beautiful flower cannot be seen if light is absent, 
qualities, virtues, assets will not be used to good purpose 
if reason and knowledge are absent. And just as the 
beautiful flower derives its generation and growth from the 
sun, the Forms derive their goodness from the Good. For 
example, we will not know justice to be just, nor courage 
to be courage, nor bravery bravery, without reference to the 
Good as a standard of goodness against which one can know in 
what respect justice or courage or bravery are "good." 
Plato's allegory of the cave (514-519) illustrates 
the same theory as that of the sun. In this analogy Plato 
is explaining that the "visible," "variable" world is like 
the wall of the cave, and the light of the fire is like the 
sun. The prisoners represent ordinary man blind to the 
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Forms. The objects and shadows of objects represent 
particulars and concepts of the particulars of the "visible" 
"variable" world. The ascent of the prisoner out of the 
cave, and his contemplation of the things outside the cave, 
is like the soul's ascent away from the "visible," 
"variable" world to the realm of the Forms. Just as the sun 
is the last to be seen by the prisoner after leaving the 
cave, the last to be seen by the soul is the idea of the 
Good (517c). 
With these two analogies in mind, along with the 
definitions given above (page 63), we can see that Plato 
thought of the Good as a first principle, a super-form, the 
Form from which all other Forms are generated. Ross states 
that for Plato the Good is a supreme principle in the sense 
that it is "the supreme object of desire (86)." Stenzel 
says that for Plato the Good is "...the object of human 
perfection," "the function of a thing," "the purpose a thing 
serves (87)." Lodge states that for Plato the idea of the 
Good is "...a system of all the ideas unified and made 
intelligible in their interrelations (88)." 
From the above sources taken together, we can now 
state that the Good is (1) the first principle or supreme 
Form, (2) the supreme object of human endeavour, (3) the 
function of a thing and (4) the unified system of all the 
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Forms. The next question we must ask is, How does Plato's 
the Good relate to his theory of Good and Evil? To answer 
this question, we must turn to Plato's theory of dialectic. 
In the Meno and the Phaedo, Plato's theory of 
knowledge involves the questionable doctrine that Forms are 
recollected by the immortal soul. In the Republic, the 
Phaedrus, the Sophist and the Symposium, however, Plato 
reformulates this doctrine along less irrational lines and 
replaces it with his theory of dialectic. In the Republic 
(534b), he states that dialectic is (1) the science which is 
able "...to exact an account of the essence of each 
thing...." In the Phaedrus (265d), he claims that dialectic 
teaches one to (2) collect "...a dispersed plurality under a 
single Form," and it teaches the "reverse of this whereby 
we are enabled to divide into Forms...." the different 
species. In the Sophist (253d), Plato declares that the 
dialectician teaches one to (3) divide the forms 
"...according to kinds, not taking some forms for a 
different one or a different one for the same" and see 
"...one form connected in a unity through many wholes, and 
many forms, entirely marked off apart." Therefore, 
according to Plato's definitions, dialectic is a method to 
discover and comprehend through reasoning the unity of all 
the Forms in a single system. In other words, dialectic is 
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a method to attain the Good (see #1 and #4 page 109 ). 
In the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato presents us 
with a theory of dialectic somewhat different from the one 
given above. Here, Plato maintains that the recognition of 
the Forms is most easily achieved through appreciation of 
beauty because Beauty is a Form whose counterpart on earth 
is obvious to the eye (Phaedrus 250b-d). Using beauty as an 
example, Plato shows in the Symposium (210b-211) that prior 
to apprehending the Forms, one's soul (nous) must have 
something like a "need," a "longing for, " a "desire" to 
reach the truth, to know what "really is," just as the lover 
has a need or longing (eros) to reach the object of love 
(89): 
Next he must grasp that the 
beauties of the body are as nothing to 
the beauties of the soul, so that 
wherever he meets with spiritual 
loveliness... he will find it 
beautiful enough to fall in love 
with... 
And from this he will be led to 
contemplate the beauty of laws and 
institutions. And when he discovers 
how nearly every kind of beauty is 
akin to every other he will conclude 
that the beauty of the body is not, 
after all, of so great moment... 
Whoever has been initiated so far 
i n the mysteries of Love and has 
viewed all these aspects of the 
beautiful in due succession, is at 
last drawing near the final 
revelation. And now, Socrates, there 
bursts upon him that wondrous vision 
which is the very soul of the beauty 
he has toiled so long for.... 
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In both the Symposium and in the Phaedrus, Plato portrays 
Beauty as the paradigm of the Forms (90). In fact, Beauty 
and the Good are regarded as interchangeable in the 
Symposium (201c): 
Never mind, said Socrates, it was 
a lovely speech, but there's just one 
more point. I suppose you hold that 
the good is also beautiful? 
I do. 
Then, if Love is lacking in what 
is beautiful, and if the good and the 
beautiful are the same, he must also 
be lacking in what is good. 
Just as you say , Socrates, he 
replied. I'm afraid your're quite 
unanswerable. 
Thus, with his theory of dialectic, Plato provides us with 
a method of reaching both the Forms and the Good, a method 
not dependent upon a theory of immortality but dependent 
only upon (1) the reasoning power of the intellect to 
discern the Forms and the Good, and (2) the desire (eros) of 
the soul for goodness. 
In the Republic (510d-c), Plato provides us with a 
second example of his theory of dialectic. Mathematicians 
posit various kinds of figures and angles which they regard 
as basic and known and with these work out their theorems. 
They make use of mathematics as models and diagrams, knowing 
that these are only reflections of the Forms, i.e., the 
circle itself, which is the actual subject of their inquiry. 
Plato gives a third example of his theory in the Phaedo 
Davis: Plato 73 
(75d-c). Here, in explaining that the sensible objects point 
the way to realities beyond them, he links the example of 
the mathematical Forms with the moral and aesthetic Forms. 
Plato's idea that through dialectic one is able to 
comprehend the Forms in the manner that one is able to 
comprehend mathematical principles seems basically to be 
plausible. But when he includes in this analogy the idea 
that knowledge of the Forms bursts upon us in "wondrous 
vision (Symposium 210c)," his theory seems to lose 
credibility. While reasoning to first principles can be 
considered a rational activity, having wondrous visions 
cannot. This dilemma can be resolved, however, if we 
examine in more detail both the rationality of Plato's 
theory of dialectic and of his idea of the Good. 
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8. 
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S 
IDEA OF THE GOOD. 
G.E. Mueller states that Plato's idea of the Good 
consists of a dialectical movement called metaxy which means 
"in-between". The meaning of human existence, states 
Mueller, is a struggle from lack of Form to Form. Because 
we desire a good and not a bad life, we are in-between these 
dialectical opposites attempting to achieve our own 
goodness. In becoming aware of this dialectic, declares 
Mueller, we become aware of the possibilities of human 
excellence. Every good action is a reminder of the Forms 
and of the idea of the Good. Every bad action is a reminder 
of the lack of Forms. We discover our own excellence, or 
lack of it, through reference to the Forms and to the Good. 
If we did not have these, says Mueller, we would not be able 
to become good (91). 
Lodge relates Plato's theory of dialectic to his 
theory of good and evil in the same manner as does Mueller. 
There is in human nature, suggests Lodge, an eternal 
conflict going on and, according to its outcome, men may be 
described as mastering themselves or sinking into slavery to 
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themselves. These conflicts are resolved by rising above 
the "competing and fluctuating sensations" to the Good. 
Objectively, he concludes, the Good is ultimate reality. 
Subjectively, it is the building up within the individual of 
the qualities embodied in the Good: 
When conduct is directed by the 
idea of good, so that, in every 
situation which life brings, a maximum 
of positive value is sought...it 
passes over into the positive 
self-unfolding of the potentialities 
of the organism as a whole, and is 
thus indistinguishable from complete 
excellence, i.e., from the ideal 
life (92). 
Martin Buber presents an interpretation of Plato's 
dialectic similar to those offered by Mueller and Lodge: 
Plato has repeatedly called 
thinking a voiceless soliloquoy of the 
soul with itself. Everyone who has 
really thought knows that with this 
remarkable process there is a state at 
which an inner court is questioned and 
replies. There, he who is approached 
for judgement is not the empirical 
self but the spirit I am intended to 
become (93). 
Support for this thesis can also be found in Aristotle's 
interpretation of Forms, according to which their perfection 
excites the development of human potentialities. Soul, 
according to Aristotle (Metaphysics 1048b), is a potency 
that can actualize itself either in the direction of the 
Forms, or away from them (94). 
Before I discuss how this gives a rational basis to 
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Plato's theory of good and evil and to his idea of the Good, 
I must point out that there is a textual basis in the 
dialogues for the above interpretation of Plato's theory of 
dialectic. For example, in the Symposium (202b), Plato says 
that eros, considered to be the upward impulse to goodness, 
is intermediate between beautiful and ugly, good and bad: 
Very well, then, she went on, why 
must you insist that what isn't 
beautiful is ugly, and that what isn't 
good is bad? Now, coming back to 
Love, you've been forced to agree that 
he is neither good nor beautiful, but 
that's no reason for thinking that he 
must be bad and ugly. The fact is 
that he's between the two. 
In the Theaetetus (109a), he states that thought is a silent 
debate of the psyche with itself, with final pronouncement 
being right belief (95): 
...when the mind is thinking, it 
is simply talking to itself, asking 
questions and answering them, and 
saying yes or no. When it reaches a 
decision —which may come slowly or in 
a sudden rush--when doubt is over and 
the two voices affirm the same thing, 
then we call that its 'judgement.' So 
I should describe thinking as 
discourse, and judgement as a 
statement pronounced, not aloud to 
someone else, but silently to oneself. 
In the Lysis (217c-21'8b), Plato claims that the philosopher, 
desiring wisdom, must be neither wise nor ignorant. Also in 
the Lysis (217b), Plato, in attempting to discover the 
nature of friendship, explains that there are three classes: 
good, evil, and that which is neither. That which is 
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neither evil nor good becomes friendly with good because of 
the presence of evil. For example, the body, which is 
neither good nor evil, is compelled when it becomes sick 
(evil) to take medicine (good). Thus, concludes Plato, we 
can say that evil (disease) points the way towards good 
(medicine). Similarly, the soul, in a state of becoming 
good or evil, becomes friendly with good because of evil. 
Good, says Plato (220d), is loved on account of evil by 
souls who are intermediate between good and evil: This 
then it appears is the nature of good. It is loved on 
account of evil by us who are intermediate between evil and 
good but in itself and for itself it is of no use^ In the 
Gorgias (472d-476), Plato states that to inflict wrong is 
worse that to suffer wrong, since the more evil one is, the 
more one injures one's self. The greatest of all evils, 
says Plato, is to do wrong and escape punishment, since he 
who is punished is made better because he is rid of the evil 
in his soul. The man who flees from punishment is like one 
who needs an operation but is afraid of the pain and, 
consequently, is blind to the benefit it will bring. 
This interpretion of Plato's theory of dialectic is 
also central in the Republic (509d-511e). Here Plato 
divides existence into three regions: the existent (the 
Forms), the non-existent, and that which is between the two 
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(the particulars). Corresponding to existence is knowledge; 
corresponding to non-existence is ignorance; and 
corresponding to the intermediate region is opinion. The 
soul, struggling to reach knowledge, is always caught 
somewhere between knowledge and ignorance. This is 
essentially the meaning of Plato's story in the Phaedo 
(253-257) in which the soul is analogous to the black horse, 
the white horse and the charioteer. Plato presents a 
similar picture in Laws V (732b-d). Here two antagonistic 
principles, reason and necessity, form a sort of divine 
battleground with man's soul caught in between. 
At the end of the last chapter we gave credence to 
the belief that knowledge of the Forms and the Good might 
come through a process of dialectical reasoning. However, 
when we considered Plato's notion that knowledge of the 
Forms and the Good could also come through a sudden burst of 
"wondrous vision" we expressed some skepticism. But from 
the above, we can see that the process of dialectic is one 
of "grappling with values," as Buber maintains "...a state 
at which an inner court is questioned and replies...." 
William James, in giving a rational account of such a sudden 
illumination, explains that ideas previously peripheral in 
our consciousness sometimes suddenly take a central place in 
our psyche. Ideas, states James, work subconsciously or 
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unconsciously and tend to ripen in silence, a phenomenon he 
calls "unconscious cerebration" in which "...on a certain 
day the real meaning of the thought peals through for the 
first time (96)." 
Findlay accounts for this process of "illumination" 
in a similar manner: 
Our sense of values, moreover, as 
pervasively present in the 
intellectual as in any other sphere, 
makes us feel that what is standard, 
graspable, light-giving, directive, is 
not any and every mixed state or 
condition but only certain priviliged 
sorts of state or condition, which 
stand out from others, and about which 
and between which other unprivileged 
states or conditions cluster and have 
their nearer or further place (97). 
Therefore, when Plato's idea of "wondrous vision" is stated 
in the more commonplace terms of James and Findlay, it does 
become plausible. Most of us at one time or another have 
wrestled with a decision. At some point in this process, an 
answer to the question being grapled with must materialize. 
It is not improbable that this would be like Plato's 
"wondrous vision." 
The above considerations have shown how Plato's idea 
of dialectic both is central to his theory of good and evil 
and is, basically, plausible. With the help of his theory 
of dialectic, we can now examine the rationality of his 
theory of the Good. To begin, we have seen that the 
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contradiction between Forms and lack of form is the same as 
the contradiction between good and evil. The nature of the 
relationship between the Form and the individual is not only 
one of thought, as I outlined in chapter Three, but also one 
of need, desire and aspiration for goodness (the Phaedrus, 
the Symposium), as well as one of guilt, remorse, misery 
(the Lysis, the Gorgias). Or, stated in a slightly 
different manner, the extent of the goodness of one's life 
is determined by one's awareness of evil (the Gorgias), and 
this one realizes through reference to the Forms (the Sy 
mposium , the Phaedrus). As we stated earlier (page 70), 
in order for one's conscience to do it's job of telling one 
that one's actions are good or evil, it must have a 
principle of ideality (the Forms and the Good) upon which 
to base its decisions. Thus, this principle of ideality 
within one's conscience could be considered a sort of 
"internal psychical cause." 
In order to understand this idea of cause fully, we 
must return to an earlier discussion (page 1). Socrates 
believed that things can only be understood in terms of 
their excellence. If one wants to know what courage is, one 
must ask someone who excels in that virtue, a great general 
for example (the Laches 1908). If one wants to know about 
the virtue of temperance, one asks a person who excels in 
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that virtue (the Charmedides 158e). Similarly, in the 
Phaedo (97c), Socrates says if one wants to discover the 
cause for anything the question to ask is, How is it best 
for that thing "...to be or to act or to be acted upon...?" 
In the Greater Hippias (296e), he relates cause to that 
which is "beneficial." In the Gorgias (475a), he states 
that "...superior excellence is due to superior pleasure or 
usefulness or both." The term "cause" for Plato, therefore, 
is not like our meaning of cause which normally is thought 
of as cause and effect. For Plato, to understand the cause 
of something one must understand to what extent it is good. 
We can readily understand the rationality of this 
idea of cause by referring to an analogy. If there were no 
difference in degree between the hockey-playing ability of 
Bobby Orr and of Eddie Shack it would be impossible for us 
to really understand what hockey-playing was. Without the 
principle of excellence or ideality we could never learn the 
difference between the success or failure of an activity and 
would be unable to understand the activity itself. In 
Platonic terms, we understand something by reference to its 
excellence. The degree of excellence we discover by the 
difference of degrees. It is precisely because Bobby Orr 
does come closer to the idea of excellence in hockey playing 
that we are able to understand hockey playing. The Form of 
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Hockey Player, therefore, causes us to understand the hockey 
playing of both Bobby Orr and Eddie Shack. This is not 
different from saying that the Form of Circle causes the two 
imperfect circles insofar as the circles are to be 
understood as circular. This position is the reverse of 
that outlined in Chapter Two. There, we stated that the 
difference of degree of circularity caused us to project 
the idea of the perfect circle. Here, the Form of Circle 
causes both of the above circles in that it makes them 
understandable. If we consider that the good for the hockey 
player is to score goals, we can understand that the Good is 
cause insofar as it is the end of an endeavour, the ideal on 
which the heart (eros) is set. This point is illustrated in 
the Gorgias (468b): 
SOCRATES: It is in pursuit of 
the good, then, that we walk when we 
walk, thinking this the better course, 
and when on the contrary we stand, we 
stand for the same reason, for the 
sake of the good. Is it not so? 
This definition of the Good brings us back to our definition 
given earlier (page 65), that the Good is "the supreme 
object of human endeavour." Thus, we can conclude that the 
Forms and the Good are cause in that they allow us to 
understand objectively both the endeavour and its intent. 
If we add to this definition that the Forms and the Good are 
subjectively operative within the human psyche as "internal 
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psychical cause," we are brought back to the discussion on 
page 71 of the idea of soul as self-moving principle. 
There, we suggested that souls could be at the same time in 
actuality and in potency. Now we see that the good and the 
Forms are both objective cause and are internal psychical 
cause. The soul, therefore, can be considered self- moving 
in that self-motion results from eros, i.e. internal 
psychical cause, being directed towards the Good, i.e. 
objective cause (the Symposium 204). The above discussion 
can be summed up by a quote from Aristotle (Metaphysics 
1072b25): 
And since that which is moved 
and is a mover is thus an 
intermediate, there is something which 
causes motion without being moved, and 
this is eternal, a substance, and an 
actuality. And this is the way in 
which the object of desire or the 
intelligible object moves, namely, 
without itself being moved. Of these, 
the primary objects are the same, for 
the object of desire is that which 
appears to be noble, and the primary 
object of wish is that which is noble. 
We desire because it seems rather that 
it seems because we desire, and 
thinking is the starting-point. Now 
the intellect is moved by the 
intelligible, and things which are 
intelligible in virtue of themselves 
are in one of the two columns of 
opposites, and of these, substances 
are primary, and of substances, that 
which is simple and in actuality is 
primary. 
Conversely, we must add that just as the Good is cause in 
Davis: Plato 84 
that it provides an "actuality" towards which we move, lack 
of the good is also cause for it provides a lack from 
which we move. In this sense evil must be considered to 
perform a positive function in that it points to the Good. 
With all this in mind we can entertain Plato's idea 
that the Good is not simply cause for the individual, but 
is, in fact, universal cause. Plato's claim that all life 
must function according to a principle of goodness does not 
mean that every inanimate thing is conscious of the good 
towards which it grows, but that life as a whole seems to be 
arranged according to the principle of what is best for its 
survival. This notion seems to me to be plausible. Life 
does seem to be arranged in such a way that reason or 
intelligence, in the case of man, or instinct in the case 
of animals, or simple biological drives in the case of plant 
life, is directed towards the survival of the species. 
Ultimately, the only criterion any entity has for 
determining the desirability of any action is its own 
survival. An action is desirable only if it will give good 
results. The frog survives because it instinctively 
arranges its life according to the principle of what is good 
for the frog's survival. 
Mention of the frog reminds us of the proftem of 
association mentioned in Chapter Three. There we discussed 
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the fact that it is difficult to imagine that stones or mud 
could have Forms. Now we can see how the Form of Mud or of 
Stone can have principles of excellence. The stonemason 
would view a rock against the principle of excellence in 
terms of building just as the frog would view the mud with a 
mind to the principle of excellence in terms of hiding. Mud 
or stones are part of Plato's universal scheme insofar as 
they are used for some good purpose. When we pick up some 
mud, we do so because we think it good, just as when we 
stand or sit or walk we do so because we think it is good 
(the Gorgias 468b). As stated in the Symposium (205e), the 
cause of all that we do is the Good: 
Love never longs for either the 
half or the whole of anything except 
the good. For men will even have 
their hands and feet cut off if they 
are once convinced that those members 
are bad for them. Indeed I think we 
only prize our own belongings insofar 
as we say that the good belongs to us 
and the bad to someone else, for what 
we love is the good and nothing but 
the good. 
Consequently, the idea of the Good is for Plato a universal 
teleological principle (98). 
If the Good were absent from Plato's scheme, we might 
consider it nothing more than a fanciful rationale of 
self-assertion. After all, the good for the hockey player 
is to score goals and make money. If the Good is what we 
want or think most worth having, then the Good is nothing 
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other than egotistical desire. But, as outlined in Chapter 
5, egotism and its accompanying train of appetite, desire 
and want can only end in self-destruction. Our drives 
through self-mastery must be directed not towards the 
subjective goods of the ego, but to the good of both 
ourselves and others, in other words, to the good of the 
whole. The good for self cannot be realized without 
including the good for others. Self does not live in a 
vacuum. 
Beyond Goodness itself we do not need to go, 
concludes Plato. It is the justification of its own 
existence, like happiness in the Symposium (205a). One 
does not need to ask, Why does one want to be happy? The 
answer is obvious: 
Well, then, she went on, suppose 
that, instead of the beautiful, you 
were being asked about the good. I 
put it to you, Socrates. "What is it 
that the lover of the good is longing 
for?" 
To make the good his own. Then 
what will he gain by making it 
his own? I can make a better 
shot at answering that, I said. 
He'll gain happiness. Right, said 
she, for the happy are happy 
inasmuch 
as they possess the good, and since 
there's no need for us to ask why men 
should want to be happy, I think your 
answer is conclusive. 
Now the rationality of Plato's idea of the Good and 
its importance to the rationality of Plato's theory of good 
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and evil as a whole becomes clear. Plato considers that 
virtues, moral qualities, physical assets, and material 
assets are good. For example, in Laws X (900d), Plato 
states that "prudence," "understanding," and "valour"; 
"righteousness," "temperance," and "wisdom" are good. In 
the Gorgias (467e), he states that "wisdom," "health," and 
"wealth" are good. In the Euthydemus (280), however, he 
qualifies these statements. Good things, he says, cannot be 
good if they are not used rightly. Anything, claims Plato 
in Laws II (661c), that might be considered good be it 
"...sight, hearing, sensation, life itself, are 
superlatively evil..." if not used properly. In the 
Republic (353), Plato cites an example. Lack of excellence 
in the pruning knife—dullness in other words-- is an evil 
which can harm the vine. Therefore, declares Plato, things 
or qualities are not good in themselves but are good only 
insofar as their uses and their function conform to that 
principle of excellence which Plato calls the Good. In 
summary, then, we can state that the Good is the 
teleological principle to which we look in making any 
choice, implementing any action, performing any function, 
for our decisions are made on the basis of what is the best 
Our ability to be good or evil, therefore, depends on 
whether or not our reason has understood what is best. Even 
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a failure to achieve good results can be explained as the 
consequence of our being mistaken about what would be best. 
It is for this reason that Socrates insists in the Meno 
(77e) that to willingly choose to do evil is contrary to 
human nature. If we do, we are choosing what we think is 
good, ignorant of the fact that it is evil. 
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9. 
PLATO'S THEORY OF BALANCE AND PROPORTION 
In the Timaeus (46d-47e) and in Laws X (897a-d), 
Plato attempts to explain the existence of good and evil by 
using cosmic and religious myth. In these dialogues, Plato 
maintains that the fact that there is a general order, 
sameness and regularity in the universe, as exemplified in 
the regularity and mathematical perfection of the movement s 
of the planets, proves that a principle of intelligence or 
reason maintains the cosmos in a unified and balanced 
harmony. Reason must be more powerful than chaos, claims 
Plato, for if it were not the universe would not survive. 
Reason or intelligence is called by Plato either God, 
Nous or the Demiurge (the Republic 530a, 507c, the Sophist 
265c, the Statesman 270, the Timaeus 41a, 42e, 68e, 69c). 
In the Timaeus (27d-30c), Plato states that God made the 
visible cosmos in imitation of the Form Cosmos and put it in 
the invisible world-soul to maintain the cosmos in 
mathematical balance and proportion (46d-47e) (99). From 
time to time, however, reason or world-soul is subject to, 
or overcome by, evil. In the Laws X (896d-e) and in the 
Epinomis (988e), Plato posits world-souls with two natures, 
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the evil nature sometimes overpowering the good. In the 
Timaeus (49e) and the Statesman (270a), he posits a 
world-soul which is at times overcome by an independent 
force, necessity, causing natural calamities such as floods 
or hurricanes. But apart from these small differences Plato 
maintains in all four dialogues that world-soul is 
responsible for good (order, harmony, balance) but is 
subject from time to time either to necessity or bad souls 
which cause evil (chaos, disorder) (100). 
The idea of reason or world-soul directing existence 
according to a principle of harmony, balance and order, 
reminds us of the description of the soul as a principle of 
self-motion in Chapter 8 (101). In fact, a step-by-step 
comparison can be drawn between Plato's ideas of the 
individual soul and of the cosmic soul. For example, just 
as evil is caused by unlimited appetites and desires 
overcoming the nous of the particular soul (page 53), evil 
in the cosmic soul is caused by the presence of bad souls 
overcoming the Nous of the cosmos. And just as necessity 
produces evil consequences such as sickness and misery in 
the individual (page 56), necessity produces calamities like 
floods, in the cosmos. Similarly, when nous is master of 
the individual, he will be good (page 53); so also when Nous 
is master of the cosmos, it will be harmonious. Conversely, 
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if nous is controlled by the unlimited and disproportionate 
drives of the lower soul, evil results (page 53); so also 
if Nous is controlled by the bad soul, chaos and disorder 
result. 
Plato's idea of a cosmic soul analogous to a mortal 
soul (see also the Philebus 30a) is like his idea of a 
cosmic craftsman (102) analogous to the mortal craftsman. 
According to Plato, the Divine Craftsman created the cosmos 
by copying the Forms just as the individual creates an 
object. This idea is mentioned frequently by Plato in the 
dialogues. Socrates talks of "...painters, builders, 
shipwrights and other craftsmen..." modelling the raw 
materials after the Forms (the Gorgias 503e). Similarly, 
Plato in the Timaeus (28c-29a) describes "the artificer" as 
modelling the universe after "the eternal." In the 
Statesman(200d), Plato says that products of nature are 
works of divine art just as things made by man are works of 
human art. In the Sophist (265c), Plato states outright 
that God is a Divine Craftsman. If there can be any doubt 
left, we can refer to the Republic (596c) in which Plato 
affirms that God is related to the mortal craftsman: 
But now consider what name you 
would give to this craftsman. 
What one? 
Him who makes all the things that 
all handicraftsmen severally produce. 
A truly clever and wondrous man 
you tell of. 
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Ah, but wait, and you will say so 
indeed, for this same handicraftsman 
is not only able to make all 
implements, but he produces all plants 
and animals, including himself, and 
thereto earth and heaven and the gods 
and all things in heaven and in Hades 
under the earth. 
Therefore, according to Plato, the mortal craftsman 
fashions his art by copying the forms. Thus we must 
conclude that, just as the soul of the mortal craftsman 
strives to achieve happiness by limiting its desires and 
directing itself towards the Good, the world soul of the 
Divine Craftsman strives to achieve harmony and balance by 
ordering itself towards the Good. Thus, in Plato's view, 
God is analogous to man, and the soul of God analogous to 
the soul of man. 
But, we may exclaim, surely we ought not take all 
this talk of a Divine Craftsman maintaining harmony in the 
cosmos through mathematical order seriously. Besides, we 
might add, Plato's theory is based on his observation of the 
movements of the planets, which means that Plato is assuming 
that the geometry of the cosmos must be Euclidian. But this 
is not so. Two parallel lines will not travel through space 
forever without meeting. Yet Plato himself did not intend 
that his cosmic theory be taken as fact. In the Timaeus 
(29d), he states that one cannot hope to give a completely 
precise account of such subjects as gods and the origins of 
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the universe. He is, he states, giving a probable account 
(103): 
Enough if we adduce probabilities 
as likely as any others, for we must 
remember that I who am the speaker and 
you who are the judges are only mortal 
men, and we ought to accept the tale 
which is probable and inquire no 
further. 
Even though cosmic geometry may not follow the 
principles of Euclid, we must admit that the universe is 
organized according to a very definite mathematical scheme, 
for modern physicists emphasize that the universe operates 
entirely on mathematical principles . According to Barnett, 
it is the mathematical precision of the movements of the 
universe which allows scientists to investigate natural 
laws: 
Modern physicists...emphasize 
that nature mysteriously operates on 
mathematical principles. It is the 
mathematical orthodoxy of the universe 
that enables theorists like Einstein 
to predict and discover natural laws 
simply by the solution of equations 
(104). 
In view of this statement, therefore, we might conclude that 
Plato's belief in a mathematically ordered universe has some 
credibility. Precisely how this belief relates to our study 
is the topic of the next chapter. 
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10. 
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY 
OF BALANCE AND PROPORTION 
As we have seen, Plato believed that reason maintains 
cosmic harmony and balance. In the Timaeus (47c), Plato 
states that through understanding the harmony of the 
universe man could reach an individual harmony within his 
own soul and "...become like the divine so far as man can 
(105)." In this, Plato thought, lay the secret of goodness: 
God invented and gave us sight to 
the end that we might behold the 
courses of intelligence in the heaven, 
and apply them to the courses of our 
own intelligence which are akin to 
them, the unperturbed to the 
perturbed, and that we, learning them 
and partaking of the natural truth of 
reason, might imitate the absolutely 
unerring courses of God and regulate 
our own vagaries. 
Similarly, in the Gorgias (508a), Plato states that both man 
and the cosmos are bound together by order: 
Wise men, Callicles, say that the 
heavens and the earth, gods and men, 
are bound together by fellowship and 
friendship, and order and temperance 
and justice, and for this reason they 
call the sum of things the 'ordered' 
universe, my friend, not the world of 
disorder or riot. But it seems to me 
that you pay no attention to these 
things in spite of your wisdom, but 
you are unaware that geometric 
equality is of great importance among 
gods and men alike 
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In "Book IV" of the Republic (444d-e), Plato describes 
individual justice as a state of inner harmony, the 
appetites, emotions and reason working together in perfect 
unity and order: 
And is it not likewise the 
production of justice in the soul to 
establish its principles in the 
natural relation of controlling and 
being controlled by one another, while 
injustice is to cause the one to rule 
or be ruled by the other contrary to 
nature? 
The Republic, in fact, is not just a piece of 
political theory but is an allegory illustrating a 
well-ordered and harmonious psyche. Plato shows that the 
virtues of the individual citizen ought to be the same as 
those of the state as a whole (106). Wisdom resides in the 
soul's reasoning faculty just as wisdom resides in the 
Guardians of the city who ought to take control of the 
people and keep their appetites within bounds. As health 
results from a harmonious relationship between the three 
elements of the soul, so the balanced relationships between 
the elements of the city create a condition of justice. 
Evil results when either the state or the individual lose 
their unity. 
Plato presents a similar idea in the Laws 
(644e-645c). According to the Athenian, man's unwholesome 
appetites must be ordered by law (107). Just as each 
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individual should maintain balance and harmony within his 
soul, so also should the city maintain order and unity 
within itself. The better classes, declares Plato (the 
Republic 410c), should control through education, culture or 
law the worse, just as the better part of the soul should 
control the worse through self-mastery (440e). For this 
reason, philosophers should be the guardians of the people, 
for only they contain within themselves that knowledge (of 
the Good) which leads to balance, limit and unity (540a). 
From the above, we can see that for Plato the 
individual soul is analogous to the state. Earlier, we saw 
that the individual soul was analogous to the cosmos. Now 
we can see that, for Plato, goodness of the individual, of 
the state and of the cosmos was dependent upon the soul 
being directed towards balance, order and harmony, limit, 
unity and proportion, just as earlier we saw that goodness 
was dependent upon the soul being directed towards the Forms 
and the Good. Therefore, we can conclude, as does Aristotle 
(108), that Plato's notion of the limited and the unlimited, 
unity and diversity, one and the many (the Philebus 
64e-65a), are really just different terms for the Forms and 
the particulars, and Plato's idea of measure and proportion 
is really the same as his idea of the Good: 
SOCRATES: So now we find that 
the good has taken refuge in the 
character of the beautiful, for the 
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qualities of measure and proportion 
invariably, I imagine, constitute 
beauty and excellence. 
PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. 
SOCRATES: And of course we said 
that truth was included also with 
these qualities in the mixture. 
PROTARCHUS: Quite so. 
SOCRATES: Then if we cannot hunt 
down the good under a single form, let 
us secure it by the conjunction of 
three, beauty, proportion, and 
truth.... 
Similarly, in the Philebus (64e), Plato states that 
"measure" and "proportion" are essential to goodness. In 
the Timaeus (87d), he states that "symmetries" and 
"proportions" are essential to goodness, and that lack of 
symmetry and proportion causes evil. In the Phaedo, 
Socrates demands an explanation of the world which would 
demonstrate that what holds it all together is the power of 
the good expressed in terms of geometric proportion. In the 
Sophist (228a-c), Plato states that evil is a discord of the 
soul. Deformity of the body is called want of measure. An 
ignorant soul, he says, does not find its mark, the Forms, 
because it is suffering from "lack of symmetry." 
According to Plato, everything in the world is a 
mixture of the Form and the particular, just as it is a 
mixture of the limited and the unlimited (109), and of order 
and chaos. Insofar as finitude or order prevails, 
something is good (the Timaeus 87c). Insofar as it does 
not, it is evil. From the preceding point of view we can 
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sum up Plato's entire theory of good and evil. First , 
because the Forms impose unity, limit, form, and order on 
the unlimited and the variable, knowledge is possible 
(Chapters 1-4). Secondly, when we attain through dialectic 
the Forms, we realize that they are the principles of unity, 
limit, and form (Chapters 3-8). Thirdly, the actualization 
of unity and form, measure and proportion, in the soul 
produce goodness in the individual, harmony in the state and 
order in the cosmos, just as do the actualization of the 
Forms and the Good (chapters 5-10). Fourthly, if we recall 
our original definition of the Good as the "...system of all 
the Ideas unified and made intelligible in their 
interrelations...(110)" we can understand that for Plato the 
Good is the unity of the Forms in their entirety, hence 
Plato's definition of the Good in the Sophist (253d) as "the 
One". 
STRANGER: And the man who can do 
that discerns clearly one form 
everywhere extended throughout many, 
where each one lies apart, and many 
forms, different from one another, 
embraced from without by one form, and 
again one form connected in a unity 
through many wholes, and many forms, 
entirely marked off apart. 
Finally, and consequently, evil is lack of unity, lack of 
Form, lack of order and harmony (Chapters 1-10). 
Plato's whole concept of good and evil rests on his 
conviction that existence is rationally ordered by a force 
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which aims at balance and proportion, and through them 
goodness. Essentially, what Plato is saying is that 
goodness, or lack of it, is dependent upon the Form as 
"formula." If the ingredients are right, if the measure is 
correct, then the product will be good. This is not 
different from saying that the formula for a melodious song 
is its notes and bars in proper measure, or that the formula 
for a healthy human being is the correctly ordered and 
balanced information of the D.N.A. With interpretation 
Findlay agrees: 
...it is by no means 
unintelligible to ourselves that being 
water, or earth, or air, or wood, or 
gold, or purple, or angry, or 
intelligent, or a man, or a 
dwarf-star, or an electron are all 
basically a matter of specific 
proportions or quantitative measures; 
this is the creed of modern science, 
for which we need not here argue 
rim 
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We may choose to call the principle which creates and 
sustains this order by names other than the Good, God, 
Demiurge, Nous or reason. We may even choose to deny that 
such a principle exists. But we cannot deny the fact that 
for millions of years a balanced universe has allowed life 
not only to continue, but to continue in a manner which, for 
the most part, is ordered and unified. Indeed, if it were 
not, all life would perish in chaos. It is this fact that 
prompted Einstein to state that: 
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My religion, ... consists of a 
humble admiration of the illimitable 
superior spirit who reveals himself in 
the slight details we are able to 
perceive with our frail and feeble 
minds. That deeply emotional 
conviction of the presence of a 
superior reasoning power, which is 
revealed in the incomprehensible 
universe, forms my idea of God (112). 
I agree, therefore, with Plato, as did Einstein, that it is 
rational to suppose that a balanced universe demands a 
teleological explanation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is rational to say that particular stones or 
particular circles are what they are and not something else 
because of the specific proportion and measure which cause 
them to be so. Similarly, it is rational to say that they 
are rendered intelligible by the Forms which represent these 
specifications. It is also rational to say that these Forms 
together create a single systematically ordered pattern and 
that this pattern makes possible knowledge not only of 
particular stones, circles but of all existence because the 
specificity of the Forms gives stability and permanence to 
the flux of these particulars. It is also rational to say 
that certain aesthetic and moral Forms contained in this 
pattern provide us with a set of stable and permanent moral 
directives by which we are able to distinguish good from 
evil. Finally, it is rational to say that the supreme Form, 
the Good, is the teleological principle to which we look in 
making any choice, implementing any action, performing any 
function, for our decisions are made on the basis of what is 
the best. For the above reasons I conclude that Plato does 
succeed in relating rationally his theory of good and evil 
to "the world of human experience." In fact, it is because 
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Plato has been able to give a rational basis, not only to 
this theory but the other essentially "religious" theories 
considered in this study, that Plato has been called the 
"father of rational theology." 
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51. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 255. 
52. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 188. 
53. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 233. 
54. Seligman states: "The sensible world was after all the 
place where Socratic morality was to be put in practice..." 
(Being and Not-Being, 6, n.3j. 
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63. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 169. 
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Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 99. 
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65. See Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 293. 
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 153. Findlay, 
Written and Unwritten Doctrines, 268". 
66. See the Sophist 257-259b. Seligman in Being and 
Not-Being states: Nor is the not x a species of anything. 
It is not a form with a nature of its own, but an umbrella 
under which we collect an indefinite number of kindred forms 
in virtue of a meta-formal character which they all possess, 
viz, participation in difference in relation to x. (83). 
67. Seligman, Being and Not-Being, 81. 
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Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 99. 
69. Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, 50. 
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71. Gould, Platonic Love, 121f. Cherniss states that 
"...the phenomenal world is...negative evil...in the sense 
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and truth." History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 253. 
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Philosophy, Vol. 4, 474. 
77. See also the Meno (81c), the Symposium (211a), the 
Republic (532a). 
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self-mastery see the Laws 734b, the Gorgias 491d, the 
Republic 430e, the Phaedrus 237d-c, the LacEes 191d-3, the 
Republic 473d-e. 
79. Wheelwright, Heraclitus, 36. 
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Lots are thrown out to waiting souls by Lachesis, one of the 
daughters of Necessity. All lots are mixed up: some are 
high birth, some are low birth, some beggars, some tyrants, 
some animals, some man, all mixed up with wealth and 
poverty, sickness and health. Whatever lot each soul 
chooses, that is its destiny for life. Once the lot has 
been chosen, the individual soul is taken to Clotho, a 
second daughter of Necessity who ratifies its destiny. Then 
the soul is led to Atropis, a third daughter to make the 
destiny irreversible. After that it is passed beneath the 
throne of Necessity to be born. 
81. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 273. 
82. See also the Phaedo, 81d-82b. 
83. Guthrie claims that Plato borrows his doctrine of 
immortality and reincarnation from Pythagoreanism, but that 
he transformed their religious dogmas to support his own 
philosophy (History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 249). 
84. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, 162, 165. 
85. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 360. 
86. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 40. 
87. Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, 39F. 
88. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 80. 
89. See also the Philebus, 58d. 
90. This point is also mentioned in the Lysis (216d), the 
Protagarus (460d), the Timaeus (87c) and the Meno (77b). 
91. Mueller, Philosophy of Dialectic, 131f. 
92. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 414. 
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93. Buber, I and Thou, 26. 
94. See also Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 
146, Vol.4, 349. 
95. See also the Sophist 263e. 
96. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 162. 
97. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 253. 
98. With the above conclusion Guthrie agrees (History of 
Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 351). For the view that Forms are 
not teleological see Vlastos, Plato I, 138, 141f. 
99. The idea that the unordered cosmos preceded God 
suggests that God was created. However, in the Timaeus 
(52dff) Plato suggests that God, who has always existed, 
had not yet asserted his influence. "Things were all 
together in such a way and condition as one may expect to 
find whenever God is absent." Space and becoming, Plato 
says in the Timaeus, "...existed before the heavens came 
into being..." and "...the contents of space were tossed 
hither and thither or at random in irregular and unbalanced 
movement without reason or measure" until touched by the 
hand of God. In other words, Plato is stating that chaos 
existed before God put it all in order. For Plato the 
cosmos as a whole was made in the likeness of the supreme 
generic Form. Guthrie cites Less, who states that Plato 
must mean a complete system of Forms containing within 
itself all the subordinate Forms whose likeness we can trace 
in the world of becoming (Guthrie, History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol.5, 258). Many commentators have suggested 
that the Forms are thoughts in the mind of God. This 
notion, claims Guthrie, cannot be substantiated. In every 
dialogue in which they appear, their existence separate from 
and independent of any mind conceiving them is a leading 
feature. (Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 
262) ~~ 
100. There is a very interesting parallel between a 
statement made in the Statesman and a theory by Dr. Fred L. 
Whipple. In the Statesman Plato says that when the cosmos 
has moved for aeons in one direction under the hand of God, 
he withdraws his control and it reverses its movement. All 
sorts of evils spring up and threaten to destroy it until 
God, to prevent this, takes control once more (269cff). 
Fred L. Whipple of Harvard described in his "Dust Cloud 
Theory Hypothesis" how tiny dust particles are blown 
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together by the delicate pressure of starlight. As the 
particles cohere an aggregate is formed, then a cloudlet and 
then a cloud. When the cloud attains gigantic proportions, 
its mass and density will be sufficient to set a new 
sequence of physical processes into operation. Gravity will 
cause the cloud to contract and its contraction will cause 
its internal pressure and temperature to rise. Eventually, 
in the last states of its collapse, it will begin to radiate 
as a star. Theory holds that our solar system might have 
evolved from such a process. Assuming the possibility of 
such events as these, one might arrive ultimately at the 
concept of a self-perpetuating universe renewing its cycles 
of formation and dissolution, expansion and contraction, 
life and death, light and darkness, order and disorder 
through never-ending eons of time (Barnett, The Universe and 
Dr. Einstein, 104. 
101. The credibility of Plato's idea of world-soul should 
also be mentioned in the light of modern physics. In the 
Laws (896a), Plato states that soul is the source and 
principle of motion. The definition for Plato of soul was 
the vital principle of things. (See page 54 above). 
Compare this with Einstein's unified field theory in which 
he states that all motion in the cosmos is simply change in 
the structure of the primordial field of matter and energy, 
which are in fact the same thing, for matter is simply 
concentrated energy. (Barnett, The Universe and Dr. 
Einstein, 14, 65.). Compare this also with Jung's 
suggestion that God is an eternally flowing current of vital 
energy (Psychology and Religion, 361). 
102. One question which must be asked is how does Plato 
relate God to the Good? Frazer maintains that the question 
cannot be answered because the Platonic writings do not 
supply material for judging the problem since Plato never 
attempted to explain the personality of God. (The Growth of 
Plato's Ideal Theory, 79). Ross claims that Plato believed 
the Good and God to be not the same (Plato's Theory of 
Ideas, 43). on philological grounds the two terms are 
apparently different, but on philosophical grounds the terms 
may be equated. (Plato's Theory of Ethics, 497). Guthrie 
cites Wilamowitz, Hager, de Vogel and Archer-Hind as all 
maintaining that the Good and God are the same. (History of 
Greek Philosophy , Vol.5, 559). Guthrie himself , 
howe ver, claims that tKere is no hint anywhere that the 
Forms of the Good can be equated to God. (Vol.5, 260). 
From the above conflicting statements we must conclude that 
the basic problem for Plato's commentators is his ow n 
ambiguity on his theory of God. Recognizing the difficulty 
0 
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in the Timaeus (29a) he states ..."that the maker and Father 
of the universe is hard to discover and even when we do is 
impossible to explain to all men." He goes on to state that 
he is positing a probable account of the nature of the 
cosmos, not an account which he intends one to take with 
dogmatic seriousness (72d). 
103. See also the Timaeus 29c, 30b, 49b, 53d. I should 
point out that contemporary scientific theories of the 
creation of the universe are almost as speculative as 
Plato's and the proponents of these theories would be the 
first to say that explanations of cosmic beginnings ought 
not to be taken as dogmatic fact: 
"And upon examination such concepts as gravitation, 
electromagnetism, energy, current, momentum, the atom, the 
neutron, all turn out to be theoretical substructures, 
inventions, metaphors which man's intellect has contrived to 
help him picture the true, the objective reality he 
apprehends beneath the surface of things" (Barnett, The 
Universe and Dr. Einstein, 115). 
104. Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein, 22. 
105. See also the Theaetetus 176b, the Phaedrus 253a, the 
Timaeus 90c, the Phaedo 82b-c. Barnett expresses a similar 
idea: 
Man's inescapable impasse is that he himself is part 
of the world he seeks to explore; his body and proud brain 
are mosaics of the same elemental particles that compose the 
dark, drifting clouds of interstellar space. (The universe 
and Dr. Einstein, 117). 
106. That virtue and right conduct can be legislated is 
like saying that they can be taught. The message of 
Socrates' discussion with both Protagarus and with Meno is 
that, although virtue can not be taught, right opinion can 
(381-382). The Laws reflect virtue if they reflect right 
opinion. 
107. Every law carried its appropriate penalty, ranging 
from a reprimand to loss of civil rights to death. 
According to Plato, any measure is right that will heal the 
diseased soul. Only if the criminal is judged incurable 
must he be put to death. By our standards, however, Plato 
is extremely free with the death penalty. One is put to 
death for murder, sedition (854b-c), open atheism(909a), 
temple robbery (854e) persistent perjury (937c), acceptance 
of bribes (955d), perversions of justice (938c), and 
dissenting harmful notions (952c-d). 
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108. Aristotle states (Metaphysics 1078b): It is also 
evident what the underlying matter is in virtue of which the 
Forms are predicated of the sensible things, and the One is 
predicated of the Forms; this is the Dyad, or the Great and 
the Small. 
109. See also the Parmenides 128f, The Theaetetus 180c. 
110. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 80. 
111. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 256. 
112. Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein, 109. 
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